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HAMMERING IN SCREWS: WHY THE COURT SHOULD LOOK
BEYOND SUMMARYJUDGMENT WHEN RESOLVING § 1983
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DISPUTES
TERESSA E. RAVENELL*
"If the only tool you have is a hammer, you tend to see every
problem as a nail." - Abraham Maslow
I. INTRODUCTION
S ECTION 1983,1 qualified immunity, and their relationship to pre-trial
disposition motions are common subjects among legal academics.2
Since 1985, the Supreme Court has consistently advised courts to treat
qualified immunity as a question of law and to use summaryjudgment as a
tool with which to resolve qualified immunity disputes. In Harlow v. Fitzger-
ald,3 the seminal case regarding pre-trial disposition of qualified immunity
claims, the Court noted that "[o] n summary judgment, the judge appro-
priately may determine, not only the currently applicable law, but whether
that law was clearly established at the time an action occurred." 4 Further-
more, the Court has held that qualified immunity is a question for the
court. In combination, these suggestions have led many lower courts to
treat all qualified immunity disputes as if they are identical in character
and to resolve them at the summary judgment stage. Yet, not all issues of
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. B.A., 1998 University
of Virginia; J.D., 2002, Columbia University School of Law. I would like to thank
Dean Reveley and The College of William and Mary School of Law for affording
me the opportunity to write this Article. I am also grateful for the comments and
encouragement of Katherine Franke, Taunya Banks, Ed Brunet, John Jeffries,
Kathy Urbonya, Paul Marcus and Jim Moliterno, all of whom have reviewed and
commented on this Article during one or more of its various stages. Additional
thanks are due to Barbara Armacost, Kim Ford-Mazari, George Rutherglen, Paul
Stephan and Stephen Smith, whose comments helped me transform an idea into a
draft. I am forever indebted to Mildred Robinson and Riley Ross, both of whom
encourage and inspire me on a daily basis. Finally, I thank my able research
assistants, Maggie Shoup and Sara Lenet.
1. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996) (providing federal remedy to plaintiffs who are
deprived of constitutional or protected statutory right by person acting under
color of state law).
2. See, e.g., David J. Ignall, Making Sense of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judg-
ment and Issues for the 7ier of Fact, 30 CAL. W. L. REv. 201, 202-04 (1994) (outlining
problems inherent in using summary judgment to raise qualified immunity
defense).
3. 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (defining qualified immunity as affirmative defense
that shields government officials from monetary liability in absence of clearly es-
tablished law).
4. Id. at 818.
(135)
1
Ravenell: Hammering in Screws: Why the Court Should Look beyond Summary Jud
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
qualified immunity are "nails" and summary judgment is often not the
most suitable tool with which to resolve qualified immunity issues.
Most scholars who have previously discussed resolution of § 1983
qualified immunity suits through summary judgment focus on qualified
immunity's factual nature. They argue that courts will have difficulty
resolving qualified immunity disputes before trial because qualified immu-
nity is an inherently fact-based inquiry.5
Evidentiary burdens are a related, but seldom discussed aspect of
qualified immunity claims. 6 Most courts simply assume that evidentiary
burdens are necessary for the resolution of qualified immunity disputes.
7
Nevertheless, courts as a whole have failed to develop a uniform approach
to burdens of production and persuasion in § 1983 qualified immunity
cases.8 Five circuit courts require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant
is not entitled to qualified immunity.9 Three circuit courts require the
5. See, e.g., Alan Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and
the Role of Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 6-8 (1997) ("[C]ourts
and commentators alike have failed to appreciate that factual issues are an inher-
ent part of the qualified immunity inquiry, notwithstanding the formal designation
of qualified immunity as an issue of law .... [T]he intersection of a fact-based
qualified immunity doctrine and summary judgment law generates significant con-
ceptual problems."); Mary MacKenzie, Note, The Doctrine of Qualified Immunity in
Section 1983 Actions: Resolution of the Immunity Issue on Summary Judgment, 25 SUFFOLK
U. L. REv. 673, 698 (1991) ("The Supreme Court's directive that federal courts
dispose of qualified immunity issues on summary judgment motions presents curi-
ous problems. One unresolved question is whether the immunity issue can be
decided solely as a matter of law or if the fact-intensive inquiry inherent in the
substantive standard precipitates jury resolution.").
6. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. (noting that judge may determine whether law
was clearly established at time action occurred at summary judgment stage). It
seems somewhat surprising that this issue is so often overlooked. The Supreme
Court has urged (one might even say instructed) lower courts to try to resolve
qualified immunity disputes at the summary judgment stage.
Summary judgment is structured around evidentiary burdens. See, e.g., Celo-
tex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986) (noting that burden in summary
judgment is shifted to party opposing motion to demonstrate existence of "genu-
ine issue" for trial); Chen, supra note 5, at 91 ("Before courts may apply summary
judgment procedure to a particular claim, they must first determine which party
bears the burden of persuasion."); Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Sec-
ond Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 84 (1990) (noting that Celo-
tex restructures parties' evidentiary burdens at summary judgment to reflect their
evidentiary burdens at trial). Thus, it would seem difficult (if not impossible) to
resolve summary judgment disputes without first determining which party bears
the burden of proof and persuasion at trial.
7. See generally Crawford-El v. Britton, No.89cv03076, 1996 WL 525591, at *1
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 28, 1996) (addressing procedure for officers asserting qualified
immunity and proper evidentiary burdens).
8. I have categorized the circuits based upon the language employed in re-
cent qualified immunity § 1983 cases that discuss qualified immunity's evidentiary
burdens.
9. See Douglas v. Dobbs, 419 F.3d 1097, 1100 (10th Cir. 2005) ("When a de-
fendant raises a claim of qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
show that the defendant is not entitled to that immunity."); Mihos v. Swift, 358
F.3d 91, 98 (1st Cir. 2004) ("[F]or the plaintiff to overcome a qualified immunity
[Vol. 52: p. 135136
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defendant to prove that he is entitled to qualified immunity.10 The Ninth
Circuit applies a hybrid approach, requiring that the plaintiff bear the bur-
den of proof on certain aspects of qualified immunity and that the defen-
dant bear the burden of proof on others.I' D.C. Circuit cases, for the
most part, do not indicate which (if either) party bears the burden of
proof on questions of qualified immunity. Instead, D.C. Circuit opinions
tend to word the issue as if it is simply a question for the court. 12 Finally,
the Sixth Circuit opinions alternate between assigning the burden to the
plaintiff and assigning the burden to the defendant.
13
defense he must show that his allegations, if true, establish a constitutional viola-
tion that the right was clearly established and that a reasonable official would have
known that his actions violated the constitutional right at issue."); Johnson v. Deep
E. Tex. Reg'l Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 379 F.3d 293, 301 (5th Cir. 2004)
("When a governmental official with discretionary authority is sued for damages
under section 1983 and properly raises the defense of qualified immunity, the
plaintiff bears the burden of rebutting that defense."); Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d
279, 290 (7th Cir. 2004) ("The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the exis-
tence of a clearly established constitutional right."); Crosby v. Monroe County, 394
F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004) ("Once the official has established that he was
engaged in a discretionary function, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrat-
ing that the official is not entitled to qualified immunity.").
10. See Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 80 (2d Cir. 2004) (placing burden
on defendant); Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2003) ("The burden of
proof and persuasion with respect to a claim of qualified immunity is on the defen-
dant official."); Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 142 n.15 (3d Cir. 2001) ("It
is the defendant's burden to establish that they are entitled to such immunity.
That is, the defendants must show that their conduct did not violate clearly estab-
lished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.").
11. See, e.g., Alford v. Haner, 333 F.3d 972, 977 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
plaintiff bears burden of proving that law was clearly established and that defen-
dant bears burden of proving "that a reasonable police officer could have believed,
in light of the settled law, that he was not violating a constitutional right"), rev'd sub
nom. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152-56 (2004) (concluding that Ninth
Circuit's rule that offense establishing probable cause must be "closely related" to,
and based on same conduct as, offense identified by arresting officer at time of
arrest, is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent); Creighton v. Anderson, 922
F.2d 443, 447 (8th Cir. 1990) ("Once the plaintiff has demonstrated that the law
governing the plaintiff's rights was clearly established at the time of the defen-
dant's acts, the defendant has the burden of proof with respect to all other ele-
ments of the qualified immunity defense.").
12. See, e.g., Int'l Action Ctr. v. United States, 365 F.3d 20, 24-25 (D.C. Cir.
2004) ("A court performing a qualified immunity inquiry must first determine
whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional
right."); Stewart v. Evans, 351 F.3d 1239, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (same); Lederman
v. United States, 291 F.3d 36, 46 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (same); Butera v. Dist. of Colum-
bia, 235 F.3d 637, 646 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (same).
13. See, e.g., Barrett v. Steubenville City Schs., 388 F.3d 967, 970 (6th Cir.
2004) ("The plaintiff... thus, bears the ultimate burden of proof to show that the
defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity."); Tucker v. City of Richmond,
388 F.3d 216, 220 (6th Cir. 2004) ("Given that qualified immunity is an affirmative
defense, the defendants bear the burden of showing that the challenged act was
objectively reasonable in light of the law existing at that time.").
3
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One explanation for these variations is that the assignment of eviden-
tiary burdens will depend upon the nature and timing of the defendant's
qualified immunity argument. 1 4 Even when one accounts for these fac-
tors, however, variations in appellate courts' approaches to evidentiary
burdens in § 1983 qualified immunity remain.
This Article, like its predecessors, discusses evidentiary burdens in
§ 1983 cases where the defendant has raised a qualified immunity defense.
Nevertheless, the criticism and approach of this Article are markedly dif-
ferent from those of previous articles. I argue that both the approaches
adopted by circuit courts, as well as those advocated by legal scholars who
have previously broached this subject, are flawed.
Essentially, there are two categories of qualified immunity argu-
ments. 15 Defendants might argue that the relevant legal rule at the time
of their alleged conduct was vague or unclear.1 6 Alternatively, defendants
might argue that, given the information in their possession at the time of
To further complicate the issue, Supreme Court opinions addressing which
party bears the burden of proof and/or persuasion on issues of qualified immunity
appear inconsistent. Cf Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1996) (sug-
gesting that plaintiff bears burden of production and persuasion on issues of quali-
fied immunity); Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 511 (1994) (concluding that
appellate court, which held that plaintiff must produce "legal facts" demonstrating
that law was "clearly established," misconstrued Court's opinion in Davis and that
"[a] court of appeals reviewing a qualified immunity judgment should ... use its
full knowledge of its own and other relevant precedents"); Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) ("The principles of qualified immunity that we reaffirm
today require that [the defendant] be permitted to argue that he is entitled to
summary judgment .. "); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 (1984) ("A plaintiff
who seeks damages for violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome
the defendant official's qualified immunity only by showing that those rights were
clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.").
14. For a discussion of how the time and nature of qualified immunity dis-
putes affect evidentiary burdens, see infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
15. As I note in Part II, to obtain relief pursuant to § 1983, plaintiffs must
plead and prove that they were deprived of a protected right. See Gomez v. To-
ledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) ("[P]laintiff must allege that some person has de-
prived him of a federal right and, second, he must allege that the person who has
deprived him of that fight acted under color of state or territorial law."). Accord-
ingly, a government official can attack a plaintiffs case-in-chief by arguing: (1) that
the alleged conduct did not take place; or (2) that the alleged conduct does not
amount to a constitutional violation. See id. at 638 (detailing plaintiffs cause of
action and elements required to prove case). Defendants might also argue that
they were not acting under color of state law. See id. at 640 (noting that plaintiff
must prove that person depriving that right acted under color of state or territorial
law). Nonetheless, because defendants forego or, at a minimum, seriously under-
mines, any argument that they were not acting under color of state law when they
raises a qualified immunity defense, this argument is beyond the scope of this
paper.
16. See, e.g., Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (establishing that if
law was not clear at time that conduct would violate Constitution, then officer
should not be liable); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In
Harlow, the Court eliminated the subjective prong of the good faith qualified im-
munity defense because it raised a question of fact, thereby making it difficult to
resolve questions of qualified immunity before trial. Id. at 815-16 (declaring that
[Vol. 52: p. 135
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the alleged violation, a reasonable officer would (or could) conclude that
the conduct was lawful.
1 7
Both of these arguments are appropriately dubbed "qualified immu-
nity claims." In both, the court must compare the defendant's alleged
conduct against the relevant legal standard to determine whether the de-
fendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Nevertheless, there are impor-
tant distinctions between the two categories. Arguments falling within the
first group will focus on the state of the law at the time of the incident. In
contrast, arguments within the second category turn on the factual infor-
mation that the defendant claims to have had at the time of the incident.
Stated differently, the qualified immunity assessment will not depend
upon resolution of a factual dispute in the first category. Factual determi-
nations, however, are necessary for resolving qualified immunity disputes
that fall in the latter category.
Despite this basic difference, courts and scholars usually fail to distin-
guish these inquiries from one another. This Article argues that judges
and scholars unnecessarily focus on the distinction between questions of
law and questions of fact when attempting to resolve qualified immunity
disputes. As a result, courts often err when assigning evidentiary burdens
in § 1983 disputes. The question that courts should concern themselves
when resolving qualified immunity claims is whether there is a genuine
dispute of material facts or, stated slightly differently, whether the out-
come will depend upon the veracity of one party's allegations. Further-
more, summary judgment is not always the most appropriate tool with
which to resolve qualified immunity disputes. When determining which
procedural tool is best suited to resolve the particular case before them,
courts should consider the nature of the dispute.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides a brief history and
Supreme Court jurisprudence of § 1983 and qualified immunity. Particu-
lar attention is paid to Harlow, Anderson v. Creighton18 and Crawford-El v.
Britton.19 I argue that Anderson complicated qualified immunity argu-
ments, especially those in which the plaintiff alleges a violation of the
Fourth Amendment, by allowing defendants to pursue qualified immunity
claims based upon factual allegations not contained in the plaintiff's
complaint.
subjective element of good faith defense has been incompatible with proposition
that insubstantial claims should not go to trial).
17. See Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 205 (using "would"); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,
739 (2002) (same); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 210 (2001) (using "could"). The
Court has described qualified immunity in two similar, but nonetheless distinct,
ways: (1) an officer is entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer
would not know that the alleged conduct was unlawful; and (2) an officer is enti-
tled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer could conclude that the al-
leged conduct was legal. See Brosseau, 542 U.S. at 205 (recognizing that law must be
clearly established to ensure officer has fair notice of proscribed conduct).
18. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
19. 523 U.S. 574 (1998).
20071
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Part III contends that courts and scholars have focused on the wrong
issue when determining evidentiary burdens in the pre-trial resolution of
qualified immunity disputes. After briefly explaining how questions of
law, questions of fact and issues of law application differ from one an-
other, I conclude that legal scholars who reason that qualified immunity is
an issue of law application are correct. Nevertheless, I argue that, with
regard to evidentiary burdens, it matters little whether qualified immunity
is considered a question of law or an issue of law application. The truly
pertinent issue is whether resolution of a particular dispute will depend
upon the veracity of one party's allegations.
Accordingly, in Part IV, I divide qualified immunity arguments into
two broad categories: law-based qualified immunity claims and fact-depen-
dent qualified immunity claims. Through examples, I then explain why
evidentiary burdens are unnecessary for law-based claims. Furthermore, I
argue that because evidentiary burdens are not necessary in these cases,
the pre-trial disposition tools offered in Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are well suited for disposition of this type of claim. Part
IV.B. explains why evidentiary burdens are necessary and important for the
resolution of fact dependent claims and argues that defendants who pur-
sue this type of claim should bear the evidentiary burden at summary judg-
ment or trial.
II. SEcTrION 1983 AND QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was enacted to give plaintiffs a federal form of
relief against a person acting under color of state law who deprives the
plaintiff of a protected right.20 It reads in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of [state law] subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any . person . .. to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress .... 21
To obtain relief, plaintiffs "must prove (1) that [they have] been de-
prived of a constitutional or federal statutory right and (2) that the person
who deprived [them] of that right was acting under the color of state
law." 2 2 Although the statute was initially passed in 1871, it was essentially
dormant until the 1960s, when the Supreme Court decided Monroe v.
Pape.23 Only a few years after the Justices decided Monroe, the Supreme
20. 42 U.S.C § 1983 (1996).
21. Id.
22. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
23. 365 U.S. 167 (1981). In Monroe, the Court held that an individual acting
"under color of state law" is liable under § 1983 "whether they act in accordance
with their authority or misuse it." Id. at 172. Previously, liability was limited to
government officials acting within the scope of their authority. See Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) ("Civil rights, such as are guaranteed by the constitu-
[Vol. 52: p. 135
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Court recognized the "good faith," or qualified immunity defense, for the
first time.
24
The Court continued to refine this defense throughout the 1970s. In
Wood v. Strickland,25 the Court explained that defendants would be im-
mune from liability if they genuinely thought they were acting within the
law and this belief was reasonable. 26 Although Woods "good faith quali-
fied immunity" defense protected officials from monetary liability, most
defendants still had to go to trial to prove that they were entitled to the
defense.2 7 In an attempt to allow faster resolution of insubstantial claims,
and to spare government officials from the burdens of extensive discovery,
the Court revamped the "good faith qualified immunity" test by eliminat-
ing the "good faith" or subjective prong of the inquiry.2 8
tion against state aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individu-
als, unsupported by state authority . . . . The wrongful act of an individual,
unsupported by any such authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that
individual ....").
One might surmise that the "good faith defense" was a reaction to increased
liability post-Monroe. In Pierson v. Ray, 352 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1965), a group of
ministers participating in the "Freedom Rides" filed a § 1983 claim against local
judges and police officers alleging that their arrests and convictions were in viola-
tion of the Constitution. Id. at 215. In 1967, the Supreme Court held that the
statute under which the ministers were arrested was "unconstitutional as applied to
similar facts." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 550 (1967). The ministers, however,
were arrested in 1961-four years before the Court handed down its decision. Id.
at 549. Because it was not clear that the statute was unconstitutional at the time of
the plaintiffs' arrest, the defendants argued that "they should not be liable if they
acted in good faith and with probable cause in making an arrest under a statute
that they believed to be valid." Id. at 555. Noting that "[a] policeman's lot is not
so unhappy that he must choose between being charged with dereliction of duty if
he does not arrest when he has probable cause and being mulcted in damages if
he does," the Court concluded that "the defense of good faith and probable cause
... is available to [officers] in [an] action under § 1983." Id. at 555-56.
24. See generally Pierson, 386 U.S. at 547 (recognizing qualified immunity de-
fense). The Court did not actually use the phrase "qualified immunity" until
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974).
25. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
26. Id. at 322. The Court held that:
[S]chool board member is not immune from liability ... under § 1983 if
he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took ...
would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he
took the action with the malicious intention to cause deprivation of con-
stitutional rights to the student.
Id.
27. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-17 (1982) (outlining procedure
defendant must follow to establish entitlement to good faith qualified immunity
defense).
28. See id. ("The subjective element of the good-faith defense frequently has
proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that insubstantial claims should
not proceed to trial .... [B]are allegations of malice should not suffice to subject
government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching
discovery.") (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)).
2007]
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Under the current qualified immunity standard, articulated in
Harlow, "government officials performing discretionary functions gener-
ally are shielded from monetary liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 29 The Court
hoped that eliminating qualified immunity's subjective prong would allow
courts to resolve questions of qualified immunity before trial. 30 Accord-
ingly, the Justices instructed trial judges to approach qualified immunity
claims in the following manner:
On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine,
not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law was
clearly established at the time an action occurred. If the law at
that time was not clearly established, an official could not reason-
ably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments,
nor could he fairly be said to "know" that the law forbade con-
duct not previously identified as unlawful. Until this threshold
immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed.
If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily
should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should
know the law governing his conduct. Nevertheless, if the official
pleading the defense claims extraordinary circumstances and can
prove that he neither knew, nor should have known, of the rele-
vant legal standard, the defense should be sustained. But again,
the defense would turn primarily on objective factors. 3 1
Relying upon the Harlow decision, one might interpret the qualified
immunity standard as a three-part inquiry. 32 First, the court must deter-
mine whether the defendant was performing a discretionary function. If
not, the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity and the inquiry
29. Id. at 818.
30. See id. ("Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's conduct,
as measured by reference to clearly established law, should avoid excessive disrup-
tion of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on
summary judgment.").
31. Id. It is unclear from the majority opinion in Harlow whether an official
would be liable if he actually believed his conduct to be illegal. In his concurring
opinion, Justice Brennan notes that "[t] his standard would not allow the official
who actually knows that he was violating the law to escape liability for his actions,
even if he could not 'reasonably have been expected' to know what he actually did
know." Id. at 821 (Brennan, J., concurring). For a discussion of the extraordinary
circumstances prong in greater detail, see infra notes 31, 36 and accompanying
text.
32. See, e.g., Edmund L. Carey, Jr., Note, Quick Termination of Insubstantial Civil
Rights Claims: Qualified Immunity and Procedural Fairness, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1543,
1567 (1985) ("After Harlow, three distinct issues exist in qualified immunity cases;
a court may allocate a burden of proof for each issue."); Mary MacKenzie, supra
note 5, at 694 (explaining that Harlow requires three step inquiry to evaluate quali-
fied immunity defenses).
[Vol. 52: p. 135
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ends there.3 3 If the defendant was acting in a discretionary manner, the
court proceeds to the second part of the test, which requires the court to
determine whether the law was clearly established. 34 If the law was not
clearly established, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity and
there is no need to proceed to the third prong of the test.35 If, however,
the law was clearly established, the defendant still has the opportunity to
prove that there were extraordinary circumstances and that he or she
neither knew, nor should have known, of the clearly established law. 36
In theory, the qualified immunity test outlined in Harlow simplified
questions of qualified immunity by allowing the disposition of immunity
issues before trial. In practice, however, judges had difficulty applying
Harlow's holding because the opinion does not adequately explain what
constitutes "clearly established law." 37 Accordingly, the Court has revisited
the question of qualified immunity on numerous occasions in an attempt
to clarify the doctrine. 38 Post-Harlow, the Justices have consistently held
33. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (shielding government officials performing
discretionary functions from civil liability).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 819. Since Harlow was decided in 1984, the Justices have discussed
qualified immunity's "extraordinary circumstances" just once. See Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 648 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (mentioning that
"'extraordinary circumstances' defense left open in Harlow for defendant who 'can
prove that he neither knew or should have known of the relevant legal standard'")
(quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819).
37. See Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered
Questions, 23 GA. L. REv. 597, 605-06 n.41 (1989) (noting that Court has not an-
swered many questions regarding whether constitutional right allegedly violated
was clearly established at time). Professor Kinports identifies the following ques-
tions regarding the definition of "clearly established law" that, as of 1989, the
Court had not yet answered:
For example, the Court has refused to consider (A) whether a right can
be clearly established by district court or court of appeals opinions, or
even state court opinions, or whether Supreme Court precedent is re-
quired; (B) whether the case law clearly establishing the constitutional
right must come from the jurisdiction in which the defendant works, or
whether cases from other jurisdictions are also relevant; (C) whether a
right is clearly established as soon as a dispositive court opinion is issued,
or whether some interval is required until the substance of the court's
decision becomes known to the reasonable public official; and (D)
whether the fact that a dispositive court opinion is issued by a divided
court is relevant in determining whether the constitutional right at issue
is clearly established.
Id. at 606.
38. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (concluding that "offi-
cials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel
factual circumstances"); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 208 (2001) (holding that
"question [was] what the officer reasonably understood his powers and responsibil-
ities to be, when he acted, under clearly established standards"); Anderson, 483 U.S.
at 636 (concluding that "[t]he relevant question in this case, for example, is the
objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have
believed [the] warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law
20071
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that a right is clearly established when reasonable officials would under-
stand that their actions would result in a deprivation of a protected
right.3 9 This definition, however, has raised additional questions, particu-
larly in cases where the plaintiff alleges deprivation of a Fourth Amend-
ment right.
40
In Anderson, the Court was asked to determine whether a defendant is
entitled to qualified immunity "if a reasonable officer could have believed
that the search comported with the Fourth Amendment. ' 41 The defen-
dant, a Federal Bureau of Investigation official, conducted a warrantless
search of the plaintiff's home.42 The plaintiff filed a Bivens action against
the defendant, alleging that the defendant had deprived him of his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
4 3
Although the defendant conceded that the right in question was clearly
established, he argued that he was entitled to qualified immunity because,
as a matter of law, "a reasonable officer could have believed the search to
be lawful." 44 The appellate court concluded that the defendant was not
entitled to qualified immunity because it was "clearly established" that a
and the information the searching officers possessed"); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.
335, 341 (1986) (holding that officer is entitled qualified immunity when he rea-
sonably, but erroneously, concludes that probable cause is present); Davis v.
Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 190 (1984) (holding that violation of state statute or regula-
tion does not equate to violation of clearly established federal statutory or constitu-
tional right).
39. See, e.g., Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641 (holding that officer should not be held
liable when official reasonably, but mistakenly, believes probable cause is present).
More recent Supreme Court cases hold that the law is "clearly established" when
reasonable officials have "fair notice" that the alleged conduct is unconstitutional.
See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (noting that reasonableness is
judged against backdrop of law at time of officer's conduct); see also Hope, 536 U.S.
at 740 ("[Q]ualified immunity operates to ensure that before they are subject to
suit, officers are on notice that their conduct is unlawful."). "For a constitutional
right to be clearly established, its contours must be sufficiently clear that a reasona-
ble officer would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Id. at 40.
40. See Kinports, supra note 37, at 618 ("In evaluating whether a defendant
violated clearly established rights of which a reasonable public official would have
known, the question arises whether the courts should examine the issue in the
abstract, or, alternatively, should consider what a reasonable person in the defen-
dant's circumstances would have known.").
41. 483 U.S. at 637.
42. See id.
43. See id. A Bivens action is similar to a § 1983 action but it is brought against
federal, rather than state, officials. See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971) (authorizing
actions against federal officials similar to those authorized under § 1983). The
qualified immunity defense is available to defendants in either type of action. See
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 649 n.2 ("Those precedents provide guidance for causes of
action based directly on the Constitution, for 'it would be untenable to draw a
distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state offi-
cials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against fed-
eral officials.'") (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 n.30 (1982)).
44. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 650.
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warrantless search of a home without probable cause and exigent circum-
stances violated the Fourth Amendment. 4 5 Furthermore, the court of ap-
peals refused to consider the defendant's argument that, while it is clearly
established that a warrantless arrest is unconstitutional absent an excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, given the factual sit-
uation confronting the defendant at the time of the alleged conduct, a
reasonable official might believe the defendant's action to be legal. 4 6
On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that "the right the official is
alleged to have violated must have been 'clearly established' in a more
particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right
must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that
what he is doing violates that right."47 Accordingly, when determining
whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity, "the rele-
vant question . . . is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a
reasonable officer could have believed [the] warrantless search to be law-
ful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching
officers possessed." 48 Furthermore, "the determination whether it was ob-
jectively legally reasonable to conclude that a given search was supported
by probable cause or exigent circumstances will often require examination
of the information possessed by the searching officials." 49
The Justices may have believed that their opinion in Anderson would
clarify the qualified immunity standard enunciated in Harlow. Neverthe-
less, Anderson actually complicates qualified immunity inquiries, particu-
larly those in which plaintiffs claim a deprivation of their Fourth
Amendment rights. First, because Anderson was decided on the basis of
qualified immunity rather than the underlying Fourth Amendment claim,
the opinion implicitly suggests that, although the defendant's search was
unreasonable (i.e., in violation of the Fourth Amendment), the defendant
was entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer could have
believed the search to be reasonable. 50 Relying on Anderson, several cir-
cuit courts have concluded that qualified immunity is available to defend-
ants when there is arguable probable cause for an arrest, even in the absence
of actual probable cause. 5 1 "Arguable probable cause exists if, under all of
45. See Creighton v. City of St. Paul, 766 F.2d 1269, 1277 (8th Cir. 1985) (con-
cluding that defendant violated Fourth Amendment because defendant was aware
of "exigent circumstances doctrine" and did not have probable cause to enter
plaintiff's home).
46. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640-41 (explaining that officer must make unrea-
sonable search or seizure to violate Fourth Amendment). See generally Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1999) (explaining that officer might not be held liable
if officer reasonably believed actions were legal).
47. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640.
48. Id. at 641.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 80Y; 821 (lth Cir. 2005)
(holding that qualified immunity was not available to officer who did not have
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the facts and circumstances, an officer reasonably could-not necessarily
would-have believed that probable cause was present."52 In short, some
circuit courts have concluded that qualified immunity affords officers
greater protection than does the Fourth Amendment reasonableness stan-
dard because its standard is less stringent.
5 3
With that said, the Supreme Court has never held that a defendant
violated the Fourth Amendment by arresting a § 1983 plaintiff without
probable cause but that, nevertheless, the defendant is entitled qualified
immunity because there was "arguable probable cause." Stated slightly dif-
ferently, the Supreme Court has not held that defendants' actions were
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment but, nevertheless, that the
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because their actions were
reasonable under the standard enunciated in Harlow.
In Anderson and Saucier v. Katz, 54 the Court concluded that the defen-
dant was entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable official could
have concluded that there was probable cause for the search or seizure. 55
arguable probable cause to believe that suspect posed imminent threat of serious
harm), reh'gdenied, 175 Fed. Appx. 328 (11th Cir. 2006); Smith v. Cupp, 430 F.3d
766, 776 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that district court was correct in rejecting mo-
tion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity because there was no
threat of serious harm to others when force was used); Walker v. City of Pine Bluff,
414 F.3d 989, 993 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that no reasonable officer would have
arguable probable cause to arrest onlooker and should be denied motion for qual-
ified immunity protection); Crosby v. Monroe County, 394 F.3d 1328, 1332-33
(11th Cir. 2004) (noting question is not whether there is actual probable cause,
but whether there is arguable probable cause).
52. Crosby, 394 F.3d at 1332; see, e.g., Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480,
1485 n.1 (11th Cir. 1996) ("[W]hen the claim is that a search and seizure or arrest
violated the Fourth Amendment, qualified immunity depends upon whether argu-
able probable cause existed."). "More specifically, the qualified immunity issue in
such cases is not whether probable cause existed, but whether a reasonable officer
possessing the information the defendant officer possessed could have believed it
did." Id. at 1485 n.1. In contrast, actual probable cause exists if the arresting of-
ficers could believe, under all the facts and circumstances presented to them, that
probable cause existed. Crosby, 394 F.3d at 1332-33 (citing Durruthy v. Pastor, 351
F.3d 1080, 1089 (11th Cir. 2003) and Montoute v. Carr, 114 F.3d 181, 184 (11th
Cir. 1997)).
53. See, e.g., Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 649 n.2 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d
1339, 1348-49 (2d Cir. 1972)) (stating distinction between reasonableness in
Fourth Amendment and immunity defense contexts "has been explained as resting
on less stringent reasonable man standard.. . ."); see also Gamble v. Moran, No.
CV-90-00137-PMP, 1995 WL 35530, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 1994) (finding officer
protected by qualified immunity under Fourth Amendment reasonableness stan-
dard and Fourth Amendment standard less stringent than Eighth Amendment
standard); Moore v. Marketplace Rest., Inc., 754 F.2d 1336, 1348 n.15 (7th Cir.
1985) (quoting Bivens, 456 F.2d at 1348)) (explaining that reasonable man stan-
dard applicable to tort actions against government agents is less stringent than
Fourth Amendment standard).
54. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
55. See id. at 204 (finding qualified immunity applies if officer makes reasona-
ble mistake in probable cause inquiry); Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641 (stating officers
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The Court was unable to decide the underlying Fourth Amendment viola-
tion because either the defendant or the Court had abandoned that argu-
ment.56i Regardless of whether courts apply an arguable probable cause
standard or not, Anderson's "double reasonableness" standard complicates
qualified immunity litigation when the plaintiff alleges deprivation of a
Fourth Amendment right.
57
Second, Anderson also has the potential to protract qualified immunity
litigation by considering factual allegations and information not contained
in the plaintiff's complaint. One of the primary goals of Harlow was to
"permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judg-
ment."58 Explicitly, Harlow only eliminates one factual issue-the subjec-
tive element of the good faith qualified immunity defense.5 9 Implicitly,
however, Harlow's aim seems to be the elimination of all factual inquiries
or disputes from § 1983 qualified immunity analysis. 60 As the Court ex-
plained in Mitchell v. Forsyth,6 1 "Harlow ... recognized an entitlement not
to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation, conditioned on the
resolution of the essentially legal question of whether the conduct of
which the plaintiff complains violated clearly established law." 62 In short,
Harlow circumvented the trappings of factual disputes by basing its analysis
on the plaintiffs allegations. 63 Anderson, however, makes it clear that "in-
entitled to argue, based on qualified immunity principles, that they were entitled
to summary judgment on grounds that they could reasonably have believed search
was lawful).
56. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 208 (2001) (explaining that Court
granted certiorari only to determine qualified immunity issue); Anderson, 483 U.S.
at 637 (granting certiorari to answer qualified immunity question). See generally,
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 10.3.2 (4th ed. 2003) (noting that
Court may hear all issues presented or limit its review to particular issues when
granting certiorari).
57. See SHELDON H. NAHMOD, 2 CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION
§ 8.06 (3d ed. 1991) (noting that Anderson's requirement that courts determine
"whether the defendant violated clearly settled law in the particular case ... is
typically a fact-specific one and it introduces some complexity into Harlow sum-
mary judgment procedure and its relation to discovery").
58. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
59. See id. at 818-19 (explaining that qualified immunity defense turns prima-
rily on objective factors).
60. See id. at 816 (describing subjective good faith as question of fact). In
Harlow, the court notes that "Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides that disputed questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided on motions for
summary judgment." Id. The Court then proceeds to instruct judges to resolve
qualified immunity at summary judgment. See id. at 818 (stating qualified immu-
nity question should be resolved prior to discovery). One would think that the
justices knew that disposition of qualified immunity arguments at summary judg-
ment would only be possible if all material factual disputes were eliminated.
61. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
62. Id. at 526.
63. See id. (explaining defendant entitled to dismissal prior to discovery if
plaintiffs allegations do not state claim of violation of clearly established law).
The rule of Harlow "focuses on the character of the plaintiffs legal claim and,
when properly invoked, protects the government executive from spending his time
2007]
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formation possessed by the [government] official" is relevant to qualified
immunity analysis, even when that information is not contained in the
plaintiffs complaint.
64
Accordingly, in some § 1983 qualified immunity disputes courts must
look beyond the plaintiffs allegations to the defendant's pleadings to de-
termine whether the government official is entitled to qualified immu-
nity.6 5 This inevitably complicates qualified immunity inquiries-not only
must courts consider whether, based upon the plaintiff's allegations, the
defendant deprived the plaintiff of a clearly established right, but under
Anderson, courts must also consider whether, based upon the defendant's
allegations, he or she is entitled to qualified immunity.66 Furthermore,
because the defendant's entitlement to qualified immunity may depend
upon the veracity of the defendant's allegations as compared to plaintiff's
allegations, resolution of the qualified immunity issue may require a trial
or, at a minimum, discovery.
6 7
To reconcile Harlow (which directs courts to resolve qualified immu-
nity issues before discovery and as early in the case as possible) with Ander-
son (which recognizes that qualified immunity is a fact-specific inquiry)
several circuit courts adopted heightened pleading requirements in
§ 1983 qualified immunity cases. 6 8 Courts applying heightened pleading
in depositions, document review, and conferences about litigation strategy." An-
derson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 651 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In fact,
"Harlow implicitly assumed that many immunity issues could be determined as a
matter of law before the parties had exchanged depositions, answers to interroga-
tories, and admissions." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. See id. at 641, 658 (StevensJ., dissenting) (noting that "factual predicate"
for defendant's argument is not found in complaint, but rather in affidavits filed in
support of summary judgment motion).
65. See id. at 641 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating officers are allowed to argue
they are entitled to qualified immunity as matter of law).
66. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding qualified immunity determination
requires considering officers' allegations).
67. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998) (noting that plaintiff
will be entitled to discovery in cases where, at discretion of district judge, plaintiff
meets "hurdles" of asserting more specific factual allegations of "improper motive
causing cognizable injury" and establishing that "official's conduct violated clearly
established law").
68. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Dep't of Corrs., 222 F.3d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1204 (10th Cir. 1998)) (applying
heightened pleading standard in qualified immunity cases); Judge v. City of Low-
ell, 160 F.3d 67, 73-75 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding Crawford-El "permitted an approach
... calling for the pleading of specific facts from which to infer illegal motive"),
overruled by Educadores Puertorriquenos en Accion v. Hernandez, 367 F.3d 61 (1st
Cir. 2004); Edgington v. Mo. Dep't of Corrs., 52 F.3d 777, 779 (8th Cir. 1995)
("Complaints seeking damages against governmental officials, however, are subject
to a heightened standard of pleading with sufficient specificity to put defendants
on notice of the nature of the claim."); Brown v. Frey, 889 F.2d 159, 170 (8th Cir.
1989) (quoting Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1987)) (concluding
that heightened standard applies to enable governmental officials to prepare re-
sponse and, where appropriate, summaryjudgment motion on qualified immunity
grounds). But see, e.g., Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001)
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standards have reasoned that they are an important means by which "to
eliminate nonmeritorious claims on the pleadings and to protect public
officials from protracted litigation involving specious claims" in qualified
immunity disputes.69
A similar, but distinct, problem arises in § 1983 cases in which the
alleged constitutional deprivation requires proof of a defendant's specific
motive. As the D.C. Circuit Court explained in Crawford-El, "[t]o allow the
plaintiff to engage in discovery, in order to carry his burden of establish-
ing a basis for inferring improper motive, would violate Harlow's determi-
nation to protect the official from discovery until the qualified immunity
issue has been resolved." 70 To resolve this friction, the court adopted a
heightened pleading standard in § 1983 cases where the alleged constitu-
tional deprivation requires proof of motive or intent.7 I Noting that
"[n] either the text of § 1983 or any other federal statute, nor the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, provide any support for imposing the clear and
convincing burden of proof on plaintiffs either at the summary judgment
stage or in the trial itself," the Supreme Court concluded that a "change
(in] the burden of proof for an entire category of claims would stray far
from the traditional limits on judicial authority. '72 Even assuming that
Crawford-El only invalidates heightened pleading standards when the plain-
tiffs underlying constitutional claim requires proof of motive, the opinion
has important implications for both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and qualified immunity analysis.
73
("[T]here is no heightened pleading standard in qualified immunity cases.");
Nance v. Vieregge, 147 F.3d 589, 590 (7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that "[c]ivil rights
complaints are not held to a higher standard than complaints in other civil
litigation").
69. See Arnold v. Bd. of Educ. of Escambia County Ala., 880 F.2d 305, 309
(11th Cir. 1989).
70. Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated, 523 U.S.
574 (1998).
71. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998) (noting heightened plead-
ing standard "prevent[s] serious invasion of the defendant's time unless the plain-
tiff can, without discovery, offer specifics of his case as to defendant's motivation").
72. See id. at 594.
73. See id. at 597 (explaining that if there were need to frame new rules of law
based on distinction between constitutional claims that require proof of improper
motive and those that do not, "presumably Congress either would have dealt with
the problem . . .or will respond to it in future legislation"). The Court discusses
qualified immunity in Crawford-El because the lower court relied on Harlow's policy
discussion of qualified immunity to rationalize its "clear and convincing" evidence
standard in § 1983 cases where the underlying constitutional claim required proof
of motive or intent. See Crawford-El, 93 F.3d at 815 (statingjudgment for defendant
is appropriate unless clear and convincing evidence on official's state of mind is
presented at summaryjudgrnent or trial).
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III. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN QUESTIONS OF LAW AND QUESTIONS
OF FACT
In Crawford-El, the Court takes care to point out that proof of motive
is a question of fact and a part of the plaintiffs case-in-chief but qualified
immunity is a separate "essentially legal question."74 The distinction be-
tween questions of law and questions of fact has confounded courts and
legal scholars for more than a century. 75 As the Supreme Court recog-
nized in Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 76 "we [have] yet [to identify] a rule or
principle that will unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a legal con-
clusion." 77 One scholar has attributed this confusion to two sources:
"First, courts assume that the properly affixed characterization necessarily
determines which legal actor is assigned the decisionmaking task. Second,
the two categories have been used to describe at least three distinct func-
tions: law declaration, fact identification and law application." 78 He de-
scribed these categories in the following manner:
Law declaration involves "formulating a proposition [that] affects
not only the [immediate] case.., but all others that fall within its
terms." In a strict sense, then, law declaration yields only what we
commonly think of as "law"-conclusions about the existence
and content of governing legal rules, standards, and principles.
The important point about law is that it yields a proposition that
is general in character. Fact identification, by contrast, is a case-
specific inquiry into what happened here. It is designed to yield
only assertions that can be made without significantly implicating
the governing legal principles. Such assertions, for example,
generally respond to inquiries about who, when, what, and
where-inquiries that can be made "by a person who is ignorant
of the applicable law." Law application, the third function, is
residual in character. It involves relating the legal standard of
conduct to the facts established by the evidence .... Linking the
rule to the conduct is a complex psychological process, one that often in-
volves judgment .... [11n contrast to the generalizing feature of
law declaration, law application is situation-specific. 79
74. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 589 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526
(1985)) (concluding that qualified immunity raises essentially legal question, sepa-
rate from questions of fact).
75. See generally James B. Thayer, Law and Fact in Jury Trials, 4 HARv. L. REv.
147 (1890) (discussing difficulties of distinguishing between questions of fact and
questions of law).
76. 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
77. Id. at 288.
78. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 229, 234
(1985).
79. Id. at 236 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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Much of the difficulty in distinguishing between questions of law and
questions of fact stems from the third category: law application, which may
also be referred to as mixed questions of law and fact.8° Although, in
truth, there may be three types of legal issues-(1) questions of law, (2)
questions of fact and (3) questions of law application-many procedural
issues hinge upon whether an issue is categorized as a question of law or a
question of fact.81 Accordingly, even when courts are faced with what is
clearly a mixed question of law and fact or a law application issue, they are
confined to these two categories and must decide whether to treat the
issue as a legal question or a factual inquiry.82 The distinction between
questions of law and questions of fact is no less complex within the context
of the qualified immunity doctrine; therefore, it is of little surprise that
§ 1983 scholars have written hundreds of pages discussing this precise
issue.8 3
80. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER ET AL., The Analysis and Decision of Summary
Judgment Motions: A Monograph on Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 139
F.R.D. 441, 456 (1991) (discussing application of law to facts). Although the terms
"mixed question of law and fact" and "an issue of law application" are often used
interchangeably, some legal scholars have found it useful to distinguish between
the two. Law application, the more general of the two terms, refers to the task of
linking the facts of a specific case to a more general legal standard. See id. at 455
(explaining application of law when facts are undisputed). A mixed question of
law and fact may be viewed as a subset of law application issues. "When the appli-
cation of a rule of law depends upon the resolution of disputed historical facts...
[the law application issue] becomes a mixed question of law and fact." Id. at 456.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 242 n.2 (2001) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("J]udges shall 'decide all relevant questions of law."' (quoting Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000))); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humani-
ties, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 446 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Dimick v.
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 490-91 (1935)) (explaining thatjury's function is to decide
questions of fact). The assignment of issues to the judge or jury, the availability of
interlocutory appeals and appellant standards of review are all determined by
whether a particular issue is a question of law or a question of fact.
82. See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1985) (stating that deci-
sion to label as question of law, question of fact or mixed question of law and fact
"is sometimes as much a matter of allocation as it is of analysis"). As Justice
O'Connor explained in Miller
At least in those instances in which Congress has not spoken and in which
the issue falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple
historical fact, the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determi-
nation that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judi-
cial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in
question.
Id. at 114.
83. See, e.g., Lloyd C. Anderson, The Collateral Order Doctrine: A New "Serbonian
Bog" and Four Proposals for Reform, 46 DRAKE L. REv. 539, 593-94 (1998) (discussing
impossibility of characterizing issue as purely question of law or fact); Martin A.
Schwartz, Fundamentals of Section 1983 Litigation, 17 TOURo L. Rv. 525, 541-42
(2001) (discussing difficulty in determining "whether the immunity appeal
presents a question of fact or a question of law").
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Although the Supreme Court has held that qualified immunity is a
question of law, 84 several legal scholars have challenged this assertion, ar-
guing that qualified immunity is a mixed question of law and fact or an
issue of law application. 8 5 One commentator argues that questions of
qualified immunity always fall into the "mixed question" category of is-
sues. 86 This commentator reasons:
As with any reasonableness standard, all qualified immunity in-
quiries are inevitably fact-dependent, at least in part, because the
reasonableness of a government official's conduct must be evalu-
ated with reference to some set of facts. Courts can assess
whether a particular act violates a "clearly established" right only
by comparing the existing case law to an undisputed description
of that act. Entitlement to qualified immunity, therefore, must
be viewed as a mixed question of law and fact.
87
It is not particularly difficult to explain the difference between the
Court's characterization of qualified immunity as a question of law and a
commentator's argument that qualified immunity is a mixed question of
law and fact. As discussed in the preceding pages, the law/fact distinction
is necessary to determine the role of legal actors, the availability of inter-
locutory appeals and the standard of appellant review.8 8 Accordingly,
courts are essentially obliged to categorize qualified immunity as a ques-
tion of law or a question of fact. The conclusion that qualified immunity is
a question of law simply reflects the Court's policy decision that judges
rather than juries are better suited to resolve the mixed questions that
qualified immunity issues present.89 Much of the confusion surrounding
84. See, e.g., Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994) ("Whether an as-
serted federal right was clearly established at a particular time, so that a public
official who allegedly violated the right has no qualified immunity from suit,
presents a question of law, not one of 'legal facts.'").
85. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 5, at 7 ("Entitlement to qualified immunity...
must be viewed as a mixed question of law and fact."); Richard D. Moreno, Louisi-
ana's Constitutional Agencies: Plenary Powers or "Constitutional Illusions of Being a Fourth
Branch of Government"?, 51 LA. L. Rxv. 875, 907 (1991) ("Because the qualified im-
munity is necessarily a mixed question of fact and law, the officer cannot avoid the
suit, as he might with absolute immunity."); Sheldon H. Nahmod, The Restructuring
of Narrative and Empathy in Section 1983 Cases, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 819, 827 (1997)
("However, the objective reasonableness inquiry is not solely a legal one: it is a law
application question, or a mixed question of law and fact."); Paul D. Watson, Quali-
fied Immunity: Should a Judge or Jury Decide Who Prevails in the Battle Between Govern-
ment Efficiency and Constitutional Rights?, 20 STETSON L. Rxv. 1035, 1051 (1991)
("When the defense of qualified immunity is raised in a § 1983 action, the court
may be confronted with a mixed question of law and fact.").
86. See Chen, supra note 5, at 7 (arguing that qualified immunity must be
considered mixed question of law and fact).
87. Id. at 6-7 (footnotes omitted).
88. See id. at 88-89 (discussing distinction between questions of law, questions
of fact and mixed questions of law and fact).
89. See Elder, 510 U.S. at 516 (finding qualified immunity presents question of
law); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985) (stating that "claim of immunity
[Vol. 52: p. 135
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol52/iss1/4
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
the "true nature" of qualified immunity could have been averted had the
Court simply recognized that qualified immunity is a mixed question of
law and fact that will be treated as a question of law.
90
As previously mentioned, the assessment that qualified immunity
raises a mixed question of law and fact or an issue of law application will
affect many of the "procedural" issues that arise in § 1983 cases. Although
often overlooked, the law/fact characterization has an equally important
effect on the allocation of the burdens of production and persuasion.
Burdens of production and persuasion are evidentiary burdens. The for-
mer dictates which party must present evidence of a particular fact, while
the latter determines which party is required to persuade the jurist of the
truth of the allegation. 91 Because evidentiary burdens only play a role in
factual disputes, they are inapplicable when the issue confronting the
court is a pure question of law.92 Stated inversely, evidentiary burdens are
is conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiffs claim that his rights have
been violated" and finding defendant's claim of immunity is question of law);
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (concluding immunity question
should be answered prior to discovery).
90. See, e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991) (explaining why quali-
fied immunity decision should not be left in hands of jury). Early Supreme Court
decisions discussing qualified immunity simply noted that qualified immunity is a
question for the court. This, quite rightfully, implies that qualified immunity is not
truly a question of law but an issue that the court has decided to treat as a question
of law (i.e., it is to be decided by the judge). In contrast, later opinions make the
mistake of characterizing qualified immunity as a question of law, adding unneces-
sary confusion to an already difficult subject area. See, e.g., Johnson v. Jones, 515
U.S. 304, 312 (1995) (discussing Mitchells finding that qualified immunity is only
legal question and appeals courts do not need to consider plaintiff's allegations).
91. See Dep't of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 272-76 (1994)
(explaining differences between burden of production and burden of persuasion).
The Court has addressed the meaning of "burden of proof" and "burden of per-
suasion" on several occasions. See id. at 274-75 (discussing opinions finding that
burden of proof is defined as burden of persuasion). The burden of proof is sy-
nonymous with the burden of persuasion and the party to whom this burden is
assigned must convince the decision-maker of the ultimate issue. See id. (discuss-
ing "emerging consensus" that burden of proof is synonymous with burden of per-
suasion). Accordingly, "if the evidence is evenly balanced, the party that bears the
burden of persuasion must lose." Id. at 272.
In contrast, the burden of production requires a party to come forward with
evidence. See id. (defining burden of production). Generally, the burden of pro-
duction or persuasion remains with the moving party. See Thomas R. Lee, Pleading
and Proof: The Economics of Legal Burdens, 1997 BYU L. REv. 1, 1 (1997) (finding that
"[c]onventional doctrine assigns [ ] burdens to the party whose case the issue in
question is 'essential' or to the party who must establish the 'affirmative proposi-
tion'"). Thus, the plaintiff bears the evidentiary burdens on the elements of his
claim and, generally, the defendant bears the evidentiary burdens on the elements
necessary to establish an affirmative defense. See id. (discussing traditional tests
courts utilize to assign burdens).
92. See Irwin R. Kramer, The Qualified Immunity Vaccine: Preventing and Fighting
Section 1983 Suits Against Public Officials, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 965, 979 n.67 (1989)
("While the debate over the evidentiary burden of proof presents an interesting
issue, its practical significance diminished after Harlow since the immunity defense
now rests largely on a pure question of law.").
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only relevant when there is a factual question. Because qualified immu-
nity presents a "mixed question," it is not immediately obvious whether,
and if so how, evidentiary burdens factor into qualified immunity analysis.
Scholars addressing this issue have not reached uniform conclusions
regarding the role of evidentiary burdens in qualified immunity cases.
Some scholars suggest that evidentiary burdens are inapplicable.93 Others
view evidentiary burdens as necessary to the resolution of qualified immu-
nity disputes. 4 Scholars reaching the former conclusion tend to focus on
the Supreme Court's designation of qualified immunity as a question of
law.95 Scholars reaching the latter conclusion often focus on the fact-
based nature of the qualified immunity inquiries. 96
Both camps, however, are focused on the wrong issue. As I seek to
demonstrate in Part IV of this Article, the appropriate question is whether
the particular qualified immunity argument at bar turns upon a factual
determination. This conclusion, in turn, will inform the court which pro-
cedural tool is best suited to resolve the § 1983 qualified immunity
dispute.
V. SMITH V. BROWNA: THE INTERACTION OF § 1983 QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
ARGUMENTS, EVIDENTIARY BURDENS AND PROCEDURAL
DISPOSITION TOOLS
Following the Court's decision in Anderson, there are essentially two
variations of qualified immunity arguments. 9 7 First, defendants may argue
that the law in existence at the time of their actions was so vague that
93. See, e.g., NAHMOD, supra note 57, § 8.19 ("As to the question of the exis-
tence of clearly settled law, to speak of a burden of proof with its evidentiary em-
phasis appears misplaced. After all, whether clearly settled law exists is an issue of
law for the court."). But see, e.g., id. (noting that Anderson may "implicate eviden-
tiary considerations").
94. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 5, at 95 ("[T]he question cannot be answered in
the abstract; it must be related to some set of facts, whether the plaintiffs allega-
tions, the defendants' version of the facts after discovery, or the fact finder's con-
clusions. Thus, the assignment of an evidentiary burden may still be necessary to
adjudicate the defense.").
95. See, e.g., id. (criticizing assignment of evidentiary burdens to any party
when "underlying issue is the clarity of the constitutional rights asserted in the
plaintiff's claim"). "If that is true, then what does it mean for a party to have the
burden of persuasion-an evidentiary standard-on a (supposedly) purely legal
question?" Id.
96. See, e.g., NAHMOD, supra note 57, § 8.19 (discussing contexts where eviden-
tiary burdens are appropriately considered).
97. See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1980) (describing burden
of pleading on defendant and qualified immunity arguments available to officials);
Chavez v. City of Santa Fe Hous. Auth., 606 F.2d 282, 283 n.3 (1979) ("Defendants
also argue that the allegedly proprietary nature of the governmental activity in this
case prevents the Housing Authority's actions from being conducted under 'color
of state law' for purposes of§ 1983."). As I note in Part II, to obtain relief pursuant
to § 1983, plaintiffs must plead and prove that they were deprived of a protected
right. Accordingly, defendants can attack the plaintiff's case-in-chief by arguing
(1) that the alleged conduct did not take place or (2) that the alleged conduct
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neither they, nor any reasonable official, would realize that their actions
would deprive the plaintiff of a protected right.98 Additionally, defend-
ants might argue that, given the information in their possession at the
time of the alleged violation, a reasonable officer would (or could) con-
clude that the conduct was lawful. 99 In both, the court must compare the
facts of the specific case against the relevant legal standard to determine
whether the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.
Under the first argument, the defendant does not dispute the plain-
tiffs factual allegations. Instead, the defendant's qualified immunity
claim focuses on the state of the law at the time of the incident. In con-
trast, arguments within the second category turn on the factual informa-
tion the defendant claims to have had at the time of the incident. The
defendant may or may not dispute the plaintiffs factual account; regard-
less, the defendant wants to introduce additional facts that tend to demon-
strate that in this particular situation, a reasonable officer possessing the
same information as the defendant possessed could have believed the con-
duct to be lawful at the time of the incident. In all likelihood, these fac-
tual allegations will not appear in the plaintiffs complaint (nor any of the
documents accompanying the complaint). Furthermore, the qualified im-
munity determination will usually depend upon the veracity of the defen-
does not amount to a constitutional violation. See Gomez, 446 U.S. at 640-41 (dis-
cussing nature of qualified immunity defense).
A defendant might also argue that he was not acting under color of state law.
See Chavez, 606 F.2d at 283 n.3 (rejecting defendants' "color of state law" argu-
ment). Nevertheless, because a defendant forgoes or, at minimum, seriously un-
dermines, any argument that he was not acting under color of state law when he
raises a qualified immunity defense, this argument is beyond the scope of this
paper.
In addition to attacking the plaintiff's case-in-chief, the defendant may also
plead qualified immunity. Qualified immunity may be premised on one of three
arguments: (1) an unsettled or vague legal standard, (2) a mistake of fact or (3)
the presence of extraordinary circumstances. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551,
566-67 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining that defendant may argue for
qualified immunity when defendant was "unaware of existing law and how it
should be applied," "misunderst[ood] important facts about the search and assess
the legality of his conduct based on that misunderstanding" or "misunderst[ood]
elements of both the facts and the law"); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19
(1982) ("[I]f the official pleading the defense claims extraordinary circumstances
and can prove that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal
standard, the [qualified immunity] defense should be sustained.").
98. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999) (concluding that officers
who allowed media to accompany them to execute arrest warrant violated Fourth
Amendment but were nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity because "the
state of the law ... was at best undeveloped").
99. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (explaining that An-
derson's subjective beliefs about search were irrelevant). "The relevant question in
this case, for example, is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a rea-
sonable officer could have believed Anderson's warrantless search to be lawful, in
light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers pos-
sessed." Id.
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dant's factual allegations. 100 For the aforementioned reasons, I will refer
to the first argument as a "law-based" qualified immunity argument and
the latter as a "fact-dependent" qualified immunity claim.
Courts often classify both arguments as questions of law and assume
that the evidentiary burdens should be allocated identically in each cir-
cumstance. 10 1 When one actually applies these arguments, the differences
100. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) ("The relevant, dispositive
inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be
clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he con-
fronted."); Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641 (concluding that relevant fact-specific ques-
tion is whether reasonable officer would have believed warrantless search to be
lawful in light of available law).
The second category of qualified immunity claims, which focuses on the infor-
mation possessed by the defendant, might assume several forms. First, that the
information in the defendant's possession, although correct, could lead reasona-
ble officials to believe that their conduct was lawful (e.g., arguable probable
cause). See Groh, 540 U.S. at 566 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Anderson, 483
U.S. at 641) (stating officer is entitled to qualified immunity if reasonable officer
could have believed search was lawful in light of information officer possessed).
Second, that defendants may claim neither they nor a reasonable official in their
position would appreciate the unlawfulness of their conduct because they had a
reasonable, but nonetheless, mistaken view of the facts and subsequently evaluates
the legality of their conduct on the basis of that erroneous view. See id. at 566-67
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995)) ("Alterna-
tively, [the officer] may misunderstand important facts about the search and assess
the legality of his conduct based on that misunderstanding.").
And finally, a defendant might argue that due to extraordinary factual circum-
stances specific to his situation (e.g. reliance on legal counsel) a reasonable officer
could believe the conduct was lawful. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 ("Nevertheless, if
the official pleading the defense claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove
that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard, the
defense should be sustained."); Ross v. City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596, 604 n.3 (6th
Cir. 2005) (" [R] eliance on counsel's legal advice only constitutes a qualified immu-
nity defense under 'extraordinary circumstances.'"); Buonocore v. Harris, 134
F.3d 245, 253 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733, 741 (10th
Cir. 1997)) (concluding that reliance on counsel's advice does not alone constitute
extraordinary circumstance).
Although most circuit courts treat "extraordinary circumstances" as an inquiry
distinct from the clearly established law issue, some opinions suggest that "ex-
traordinary circumstances" are just one of many factors in determining whether a
reasonable official in the defendant's position would have known that the conduct
was illegal. See, e.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 (stating that qualified immunity de-
fense based on extraordinary circumstances turns on objective factors); Mimics,
Inc. v. Vill. of Angel Fire, 394 F.3d 836, 846 (10th Cir. 2005) ("Ordinarily, when
the law is clearly established the qualified immunity defense will fail unless the
defendant demonstrates 'extraordinary circumstances ... such that defendant was
so prevented from knowing that his actions were unconstitutional that he should
not be imputed with knowledge of an admittedly clearly established right."' (quot-
ing Cannon v. City & County of Denver, 998 F.2d 867, 871 (10th Cir. 1993))). For
the purposes of this article, the relevant distinction is between "fact-based" and
"law-based" qualified immunity claims. Accordingly, I have grouped extraordinary
circumstances arguments with other fact-dependent arguments, although, doctri-
nally, it may be more appropriate to consider them a separate category.
101. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614-17 (determining whether law was clearly estab-
lished at time of official action); Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639 (finding whether official
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reveal themselves. As this section of the Article demonstrates, when dispo-
sition of qualified immunity claims does not depend upon the evidence,
but is simply judged on the basis of the plaintiffs allegations, summary
judgment is not the best procedural tool with which to resolve the dispute.
To demonstrate how these two categories of qualified immunity argu-
ments differ from one another, I have created the following fact
pattern: 
10 2
Tim Smith has filed a § 1983 complaint against Officer
Brown. He alleges that Officer Brown, acting under color of
state law, deprived him of his Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable seizure when the officer arrested him on the
porch of the Idaho home he shared with his fraternal twin
brother, Jim Smith. Jim Smith was wanted on several Florida war-
rants. Although they did not have a warrant, Officer Brown and
several other officers went to the brothers' home to arrest Jim
Smith after learning that he was in town. Tim Smith claims that
the officers surrounded his home and ordered that Mr. Smith
come out. When Tim Smith emerged from the home he was
arrested.
More specifically, the plaintiff claims that, absent an excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, police
must have a warrant to arrest a suspect in the suspect's home. 10 3
Although Tim Smith was arrested outside of his home, he claims
that ordering him from his home to arrest him is, in effect, the
may be held liable turns on "objective legal reasonableness" of action and whether
legal rules were "clearly established" at time of action).
102. This fact pattern is based loosely upon the facts presented in Elder v.
Holloway, 510 U.S. 510 (1994).
103. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 599 n.6 (1981) (citing Steagald v.
United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981)) ("Absent consent or exigent circumstances, a
private home may not be entered to conduct a search or effect an arrest without a
warrant."); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (finding that "absent
exigent circumstances, [the entrance to the house] may not reasonably be crossed
without a warrant"); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948) (stating that
officer who enters home to arrest must have "some valid basis in law for the intru-
sion"). The Fourth Amendment declares:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Supreme Court, however, has recognized several ex-
ceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. These exceptions fall
into several broad categories: consent, exigent circumstances, searches incident to
a valid arrest, inventory searches, plain view and Terry investigative stops. See War-
rantless Searches and Seizures, 91 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CliM. PROC. 36, 36 (2003) (list-
ing exceptions to Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement). The last four
categories apply to searches of persons and property rather than arrest. See id.
(discussing exceptions to both search and arrest warrant requirements).
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equivalent of arresting him in his home. 10 4 He further alleges
that his arrest was not justifiable under any of the recognized ex-
ceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement and, ac-
cordingly, the arrest is a clear violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
SCENARIO 1: THE LAw-BASED QUALIFIED IMMUNITY ARGUMENT
Officer Brown claims that, at the time of the plaintiffs ar-
rest, it was not clear that ordering a suspect from his home in
order to execute an arrest in the absence of a warrant was a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment and, accordingly, that he is enti-
tled to qualified immunity. In this scenario, Officer Brown does
not dispute the plaintiffs factual allegations. Instead, he argues
that, even if the plaintiff's allegations were true, previous cases
did not make it clear that ordering suspects from their homes to
execute an arrest warrant violates the Fourth Amendment. 10 5 As
such, the defendant's argument focuses on the legal rule in ef-
fect at the time of the alleged conduct and the qualified immu-
nity determination will depend upon the plaintiffs allegations
and the court's assessment of the law at the time of the incident.
It will not depend upon the truth of either the defendant's or the
plaintiff's allegations.
This is a prime example of law application. It requires the court to
link the facts of a specific case, Smith v. Brown, to a more general legal rule,
the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement. The applicable evi-
dentiary requirements and the standard of review will depend upon when
and how the defendant presents his qualified immunity argument. 10 6 The
104. See United States v. A1-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding
that officers who arrested individuals outside of their home after ordering them to
come out have, nonetheless, "arrested [them] inside [their] residence without a
warrant").
105. See, e.g., Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 335 (2001) (citing United
States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976)) (concluding that person standing in
threshold of house is "in a public place" for purposes of Fourth Amendment, sub-
jecting that person to arrest without warrant permitting entry into home). McAr-
thur, however, is distinguishable from Smith v. Brown. In the former case, the
suspect voluntarily left the interior of his home and went on the porch to talk with
the police. See id. at 329 (stating that suspect left and reentered trailer two or three
times while officer spoke with him). During the course of the conversation be-
tween the officers and the defendant, the police asked the defendant for consent
to search his home. See id. When he declined, two officers left to obtain a search
warrant. See id. A third officer remained at the house and told the defendant "that
he could not reenter the trailer unless a police officer accompanied him." Id.
Regardless, at the time of the alleged conduct, the Supreme Court had not ad-
dressed the specific issue at hand-whether ordering suspects from their homes to
execute a warrantless arrest violates the Fourth Amendment.
106. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (discussing when
defendant is entitled to summary judgment). In Mitchell the Court stated the
following:
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defendant may present a qualified immunity claim as a motion to dismiss,
a motion for judgment on the pleading, a motion for summary judgment
(either before or after discovery) or as a defense at trial.' 0 7 The Supreme
Court, however, indicated that "a ruling on [the qualified immunity] issue
should be made early in the proceedings so that the costs and expenses of
trial are avoided where the defense is dispositive."' 08
A. Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Procedure:
A Motion to Dismiss
In Scenario 1, if the defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiffs claim
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),109 he would argue that the plaintiffs com-
plaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.I1 0 This
argument may assume one of two forms. First, the defendant might argue
that, assuming the truth of the plaintiff's allegations, the alleged incident
does not amount to a constitutional violation.1 11 Alternatively, the defen-
dant might argue that, taking the plaintiffs allegations as true, even if his
actions violated the Constitution, it is clear from the face of the plaintiffs
complaint that the right plaintiff claims he was deprived of was not clearly
established at the time of the alleged conduct."12
The purpose of Rule 12(b) (6) is "to allow the court to eliminate ac-
tions that are fatally flawed in their legal premises and destined to fail, and
thus spare litigants the burdens of unnecessary pretrial and trial activ-
ity."111 3 In order to appraise the sufficiency of a complaint pursuant to a
Rule 12(b) (6) motion, courts follow the rule that "a complaint should not
be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt
Unless the plaintiffs allegations state a claim of violation of clearly estab-
lished law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismis-
sal before the commencement of discovery. Even if the plaintiff's
complaint adequately alleges the commission of acts that violated clearly
established law, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment if discov-
ery fails to uncover evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to
whether the defendant in fact committed those acts.
Id. (citation omitted) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
107. See KAREN M. BLUM & KATHRYN R. URBONVA, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 85-
89 (1998) (discussing qualified immunity claims at different stages of discovery
and trial).
108. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001).
109. See FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b) (6) (authorizing courts to dismiss actions for
failure to state claim upon which relief can be granted).
110. See, e.g., McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 435-36 (2d Cir. 2004) (ex-
plaining defendant's argument that plaintiff did not establish case for relief to be
granted).
111. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201 (exploring substance of constitutional
violations).
112. See, e.g., McKenna, 386 F.3d at 437 (dismissing defendant's argument that
plaintiff's right is not clearly established). Because this Article focuses on qualified
immunity dispositions, I will limit the discussion to the latter argument.
113. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Scimed Life Sys., 988 F.2d 1157,
1160 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief."' 1 4 Generally, trial courts will not consider
evidence outside of the plaintiffs complaint when ruling on a 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss."1 5 Yet, some circuits have held that the trial court may
grant a defendant's motion to dismiss "when the face of the complaint
clearly reveals the existence of a meritorious affirmative defense.'
16
When deciding whether a 12(b) (6) dismissal is warranted, the court
must merely determine whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient. 
1 1 7
The court is not to weigh the evidence that might be presented at trial. 81 8
Accordingly, a motion to dismiss tests only the sufficiency of the complaint
and places no evidentiary burdens on the plaintiff.
Nevertheless, several appellate courts speak in terms of burdens when
faced with a law-based qualified immunity dispute at the motion to dismiss
114. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
115. See 5B CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1357 (2d ed. 1990) (explaining considerations involved in evalu-
ation of motions to dismiss).
116. 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 1357 (West 2006) (quoting Eniola v. Leasemcomm Corp., 214 F.
Supp. 2d 520, 525 (D. Md. 2002)) (exploring some circuits' response to defen-
dant's motion to dismiss).
117. See, e.g., Smith v. Cash Store Mgmt., Inc., 195 F.3d 325, 327-28 (7th Cir.
1999) (holding that trial court erred in dismissing claim because "assessing factual
support for suit is not office of Rule 12(b) (6)" (quotingJohnson v. Revenue Mgmt.
Corp., 169 F.3d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1999))); Ordinance 59 Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of
Interior Sec'y, 163 F.3d 1150, 1152 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that, upon review of
12(b) motion to dismiss, appellate court will accept complaint's allegations as true
and "consider whether complaint, standing alone, is legally sufficient to state claim
upon which relief may be granted"); Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d
Cir. 1985) ("The court's function on a Rule 12(b) (6) motion is not to weigh the
evidence that might be presented at a trial but merely to determine whether the
complaint itself is legally sufficient.").
118. See Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting
that court's function "is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might
present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiffs complaint alone is legally suffi-
cient to state a claim for which relief may be granted"); Edwards v. City of Golds-
boro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999) (explaining that purpose of Rule 12(b)(6)
motion is to "test sufficiency of complaint"); see also Yuhasz v. Brush Wellman, Inc.,
341 F.3d 559, 562 (6th Cir. 2003) (concluding that purpose of motion is "to enable
defendants to challenge ... legal sufficiency of complaints without subjecting
themselves to discovery"); Johnson, 169 F.3d at 1059 (explaining that evidence shall
not be weighed).
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stage. 119 For example, in O'Rourke v. Hayes,120 the Eleventh Circuit de-
scribed the standard for resolving a motion to dismiss based upon quali-
fied immunity. Only if the plaintiff alleges the violation of a clearly
established constitutional right does the complaint survive a motion to dis-
miss on qualified immunity grounds. 12 1 The Court explained:
Once a government official demonstrates that he is potentially
entitled to qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to demonstrate that the official is not actually entitled to it. The
plaintiff must show that the defendant violated a constitutional right,
and that the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged viola-
tion. When qualified immunity is asserted in the context of a mo-
tion to dismiss, we look to the pleadings to see if the plaintiff has
successfully alleged the violation of a clearly established right. 122
119. See, e.g., Lybrook v. Members of Farmington Mun. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 232
F.3d 1334, 1337 (10th Cir. 2000) (explaining that in response to qualified immu-
nity defense, plaintiff must "identify a clearly established statutory or constitutional
right of which a reasonable person would have known, and then allege facts to
show.., defendant's conduct violated that right") (quoting Breidenbach v. Bolish,
126 F.3d 1288, 1291 (10th Cir. 1997))); see also Mihos v. Swift, 358 F.3d 91, 102 (1st
Cir. 2004) (setting forth three-part test for determining when public official is enti-
tled to qualified immunity). The court in Mihos reasoned:
Drawing on Supreme Court precedent and our own case law, we employ
a three-part test when determining if a public official is entitled to quali-
fied immunity: (1) whether plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a con-
stitutional violation; (2) whether that right was clearly established at the
time of the alleged violation; and (3) whether a similarly situated reasona-
ble official would have understood that the challenged action violated the
constitutional right at issue.
Id. at 102.
120. 378 F.3d 1201 (lth Cir. 2004).
121. See id. at 1206 (concluding that probation officer was not entitled to
qualified immunity because conduct was clearly established as unconstitutional).
122. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Flagner v. Wilkinson,
241 F.3d 475, 480 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding asserted constitutional right of Hasidic
Jew not to submit to prison grooming policy was not clearly established at time
prison officers took action). In F/agner, the court noted the following:
Under this framework, to plead a proper claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "a
plaintiff must identify a right secured by the United States Constitution
and the deprivation of that right by a person acting under color of state
law," such that "[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right."
Id. at 480 (internal citations omitted). This approach may be attributable to the
Supreme Court's language in Crawford-El. There, the Court noted that to deter-
mine whether the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity "the court must de-
termine whether, assuming the truth of the plaintiffs allegations, the official's
conduct violated clearly established law." See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574,
598 (1998). Nonetheless, the Court only made this statement after explaining how
courts might require plaintiffs to "put forward specific, nonconclusory factual alle-
gations that establish improper motive." See id.
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This approach is problematic in several respects. The suggestion that
either party bears a burden of proof in this context is nonsensical.1 23 Fur-
thermore, courts following this approach, in essence, have introduced a
heightened pleading standard in § 1983 cases.' 24
1. Evidentiary Burdens and the Law-Based Qualified Immunity Claim
Under Elder v. Holloway,125 neither party "bears the burden" of identi-
fying relevant case law.126 Rather, the court should consider all relevant
precedent, even if the parties failed to identify the specific case upon
which the court's determination depends. 12 7 In short, at the motion to
dismiss stage, qualified immunity determinations will depend upon the
court's understanding of clearly established law and the allegations con-
tained in the plaintiff's complaint. It does not turn on the veracity of ei-
ther party's allegations.
Proper evaluation of § 1983 qualified immunity claims at the motion
to dismiss stage simply requires that trial judges review the allegations of
the plaintiff's complaint and determine whether the defendant deprived
the plaintiff of a clearly established right. The court's inquiry will focus on
the relevant legal standard at the time of the plaintiff's arrest. This inquiry
is not as simple as it may appear initially. In Saucier, the Supreme Court
issued the following statement regarding clearly established law:
If the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct
would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified
immunity is appropriate .... This is not to say that the formula-
tion of a general rule is beside the point, nor is it to insist the
courts must have agreed upon the precise formulation of the
standard. Assuming, for instance, that various courts have agreed
that certain conduct is a constitutional violation under facts not
distinguishable in a fair way from the facts presented in the case
123. One might even argue that it is doubly nonsensical to speak of eviden-
tiary burdens in this context. First, evidentiary burdens are inapplicable to the
resolution of law-based qualified immunity claims-the evidence is not in dispute.
Second, as a more general matter, it is usually inappropriate to assign evidentiary
burdens at the 12(b)(6) stage of litigation. As discussed in the preceding
paragraphs, the purpose of Rule 12(b) (6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the plain-
tiff's allegations. The plaintiff does not have to produce evidence in support of his
allegations. It is sufficient that he makes the allegations in his complaint. Accord-
ingly, evidentiary disputes and burdens are largely irrelevant at this stage of
litigation.
124. For a discussion of the heightened pleading requirements imposed by
courts in qualified immunity cases, see supra notes 68-73, infra notes 136-42 and
accompanying text.
125. 510 U.S. 510 (1994).
126. See id. at 516 (concluding that burden of production does not rest solely
upon plaintiff or defendant).
127. See id. ("A court engaging in review of a qualified immunity judgment
should therefore use its 'full knowledge of its own [and other relevant] prece-
dents."' (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 192 n.9 (1984))).
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at hand, the officer would not be entitled to qualified immunity
based simply on the argument that courts had not agreed on one
verbal formulation of the controlling standard. 128
While Saucier makes it clear that the "clearly established law" rule does
not require a court to have previously rendered a decision on a dispute
presenting an identical fact pattern, it fails to provide a bright line rule for
determining when an officer has "fair notice" that his conduct is
unlawful.12
9
A trial court's decision regarding the propriety of qualified immunity
will largely depend upon how it defines "relevant case law."1 30 Returning
to the fact pattern outlined earlier in Part IV, if the plaintiff were to allege
all of the facts discussed, the court's determination will depend upon what
case law that particular court considers relevant. For example, in United
States v. Al-Azzawy,' 3 ' the Ninth Circuit held that by ordering the defen-
dant to come out of his home, the officers who arrested him had effec-
tively "arrested [him] inside his residence without a warrant."1 32 In
contrast, in Illinois v. McArthur,133 the Supreme Court discussed an earlier
decision in which it held "that a person standing in the doorway of a house
is 'in a public place' and hence subject to arrest without a warrant permit-
128. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202-03 (2001) (evaluating appropriate-
ness of qualified immunity where defendant is not on proper notice).
129. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 753-54 (2002) ("Certain actions so obvi-
ously run afoul of the law that an assertion of qualified immunity may be overcome
even though court decisions have yet to address 'materially similar' conduct. [For
example,] 'officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law
even in novel factual circumstances.'"); Melissa M. Berry, Seeking Clarity in the Fed-
eral Habeas Fog: Determining What Constitutes "Clearly Established" Law Under the An-
titerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 54 CATH. U. L. REv. 747, 762 (2005)
(considering clearly established language of tort law in reference to governmental
qualified immunity doctrine); Leah Chavis, Qualified Immunity After Hope v. Pelzer:
Is "Clearly Established" Any More Clear, 26 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 599, 613-14
n.103 (2004) (challenging policy rationales underlying qualified immunity);
Amanda K. Eaton, Optical Illusions: The Hazy Contours of the Clearly Established Law
and the Effects ofHope v. Pelzer on the Qualified Immunity Doctrine, 38 GA. L. Rzv. 661,
667 (2004) (examining relationship between clearly established law and principles
of fair notice).
130. Compare Flint v. Ky. Dep't of Corrs., 270 F.3d 340, 347 (6th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Daugherty v. Campbell, 935 F.2d 780, 784 (6th Cir. 1991)) (explaining
that court must look first to Supreme Court, then to decisions of that court and
other courts within its circuit, and finally to decisions of other circuits when deter-
mining whether right is "clearly established" for purposes of qualified immunity
defenses), with Hope v. Pelzer, 240 F.3d 975, 981 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hill v.
Dekalb Reg'l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1185 (1lth Cir. 1994)) (holding that
"to be 'clearly established,' the federal law by which the government official's con-
duct should be evaluated must be preexisting, obvious and mandatory so that a
similarly situated, reasonable government agent would be on notice that his or her
questioned conduct violates federal law under the circumstances"), overruled by
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
131. 784 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1985).
132. See id. at 893 (detailing warrantless arrest).
133. 531 U.S. 326 (2001).
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ting entry of the home." 13 4 If the court considers the Ninth Circuit's opin-
ion in AI-Azzawy as the relevant case law, then the court is more likely to
deny the defendant's motion to dismiss than it would be if it simply looked
at Supreme Court opinions on the issue. It would seem that appellate
courts considering case law from their sister courts and district courts are
more likely to determine that the law was "clearly established" than are
circuit courts that limit the inquiry to Supreme Court jurisprudence. 135
2. Covert Heightened Pleading Requirements in § 1983 Cases
Once the court has identified the relevant case law, it may still be
difficult for the court to "link" the plaintiffs allegations to the applicable
legal rule if the plaintiffs complaint is not specific regarding the facts sur-
rounding the alleged deprivation. Several courts explicitly adopted
heightened pleading standards in § 1983 litigation to force § 1983 plain-
tiffs to include specific factual allegations in their complaints.' 36 Equally
problematic, several appellate courts consider a Rule 12(b) (6) dismissal
appropriate when the plaintiff fails to allege facts that, if proven, would
violate clearly established law.
In Gomez v. Toledo,1 3 7 the Court held that "the burden of pleading
[qualified immunity] rests with the defendant [and there is] . . . no basis
for imposing on the plaintiff an obligation to anticipate such a defense by
stating in [the] complaint that the defendant acted in bad faith."1 38 In
effect, by requiring the plaintiffs complaint to allege a violation of a clearly
established law rather than simply a violation of law, appellate courts cir-
cumvented one of the basic premises of Gomez-a plaintiff need not antici-
pate the defendant's qualified immunity claim when drafting the
134. See id. at 335 (citing United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976))
(describing court's interpretation of "public place" for purposes of arrest warrant).
135. If for no other reason, courts that consider cases outside of their circuit
will have more cases to consider and, accordingly, are more likely to encounter
similar cases.
136. See, e.g., GJR Inv., Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th
Cir. 1998) ("In examining the factual allegations in the complaint, we must keep
in mind the heightened pleading requirements for civil rights cases, especially
those involving the defense of qualified immunity.").
137. 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
138. Id. at 640 (citation omitted); see Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-
57 (lth Cir. 1984) ("[M]ore than mere conclusory notice pleading is required
[A] complaint will be dismissed as insufficient where the allegations it con-
tains are vague and conclusory."); see also Veney v. Hogan, 70 F.3d 917, 922 (6th
Cir. 1995) (holding that complaint must "include the specific, non-conclusory alle-
gations of facts that will enable the district court to determine that those facts, if
proved, will over-come the defense of qualified immunity").
As noted in Part II, the Court eliminated the bad faith prong of qualified
immunity in Harlow v. Fitzgerald. See supra Part II (describing history of qualified
immunity doctrine). The Court's reasoning in Gomez still applies to the situation
described-i.e., requiring that the plaintiff's complaint alleges a violation of clearly
established law. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998) (citing Gomez
for proposition that plaintiff is not required "to anticipate the immunity defense").
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complaint-and introduced a heightened pleading standard to the § 1983
doctrine. In essence, courts requiring plaintiffs to specifically allege a vio-
lation of clearly established law when they first file their complaint are
requiring plaintiffs to anticipate the defendant's qualified immunity de-
fense and draft the complaint accordingly. This approach ignores both
Crawford-El and the purpose of Rules 7(a) 139 and 12(e)1 40 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
If the court is unable to determine the question of qualified immunity
on the basis of the plaintiff's complaint, then the court should deny the
defendant's motion to dismiss. This is true even if the plaintiff's com-
plaint is too vague or broad for the court to determine the availability of
qualified immunity. 141 If the plaintiff's allegations are too vague or too
broad for the court to determine whether the right in question was clearly
established, Rule 7(a) and 12(e) offer the court its only form of recourse.
As the Supreme Court explained in Crawford-El:
[T]he court may order a reply to the defendant's or a third
party's answer under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(a), or
grant the defendant's motion for a more definite statement
under Rule 12(e). Thus, the court may insist that the plaintiff
"put forward specific, nonconclusory factual allegations" that es-
tablish improper motive causing cognizable injury in order to
survive a pre-discovery motion for dismissal or summary
judgment. 42
Should the court exercise either of these options, it should not treat
the disposition as a motion to dismiss, but as ajudgment on the pleadings.
B. Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings
Rule 12(c) 143 may appropriately be considered the "red headed step
child" of federal civil procedure-it is often overlooked as a method of
139. FED. R. Clv. P. 7(a) (listing types of pleadings allowed in federal system).
140. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e) (granting right to make motion for more definite
statement when pleading is so "vague and ambiguous" that party "cannot reasona-
bly be required to frame a responsive pleading").
141. See United Ins. Co. of Am. v. B.W. Rudy, Inc., 42 F.R.D. 398, 401 (E.D. Pa.
1967) (citing Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 235 (1959)) (con-
cluding that remedy for vague complaint is not motion to dismiss, but motion for
more particular statement of claim); see also Beascoechea v. Sverdrup & Parcel and
Assocs., 486 F. Supp. 169, 174 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (same).
142. See Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 598 (explaining that court has discretion to
protect substance of qualified immunity defense).
143. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c) (providing procedure for judgment on
pleadings).
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resolving legal disputes. 144 As the authors of Federal Practice and Proce-
dure explain:
[A] Rule 12(c) motion is designed to provide a means of dispos-
ing of cases when the material facts are not in dispute between
the parties and a judgment on the merits can be achieved by fo-
cusing on the content of the competing pleadings, exhibits
thereto, matters incorporated by reference in the pleadings,
whatever is central or integral to the claim for relief or defense,
and any facts of which the district court will take judicial
notice. 1
45
Like a motion to dismiss, Rule 12(c) decisions do not depend upon
the truth of the parties' allegations but on the allegations themselves.
Most circuit courts apply the same standard of review to 12(c) motions
that they use when resolving 12(b) motions.1 46 Accordingly when decid-
ing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court will "view the facts
presented in the pleadings and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." 1
4 7
144. See id. See generally 5C CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1369 (4th ed. 2004) ("[T]here probably is little
need for retaining the judgment on the pleadings as a separate procedure for
testing the sufficiency of the pleadings.").
Rule 7(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a brief list of per-
missible pleadings. FED. R. CIv. P. 7(a) (listing complaint, answer, reply to coun-
terclaim, answer to cross-claim if answer contains cross-claim, third-party complaint
if person not original party is summoned and third-party answer if third-party com-
plaint is served as only pleadings allowed). Accordingly, in the absence of a coun-
terclaim, cross-claim or third party complaint, the pleadings are closed when the
defendant submits an answer. Id. Further, a defendant must submit an answer
within twenty days of being served with the summons and complaint. See id.; see
also Bradley Scott Shannon, Action Is an Action Is an Action Is an Action, 77 WASH. L.
REv. 65, 112 (2002) (considering party responsibilities for summons and com-
plaint). If, however, the defendant files a 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss, the answer is
due within ten days after notice of the court's decision. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12
(stating procedural requirements and consequences of Rule 12(b) motion).
145. 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 1367 (3d ed. 1998) (footnote omitted) (explaining Rule 12(c)
motions).
146. See Aspenwood Inv. Co. v. Martinez, 355 F.3d 1256, 1259 (10th Cir. 2004)
("A decision by the district court granting a defense motion for judgment on the
pleadings is reviewed de novo, using the same standard of review applicable to a
Rule 12(b) (6) motion."); see also Millea v. Brown, No. 92-2734, 1993 WL 118072, at
*2 (7th Cir. Apr. 14, 1993) ("A Rule 12(c) motion forjudgment on the pleadings is
generally subject to the same standard of review as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim."); Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d
1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Because the motions are functionally identical, the
same standard of review applicable to a Rule 12(b) motion applies to its Rule 12(c)
analog.").
147. 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1368 (West 2006) (discussing Federal Rule 12(c) and explaining sig-
nificant number of federal courts have reached this conclusion).
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Because the trial court will apply the same standard on a 12(c) mo-
tion as it would on a 12(b) motion, a motion on the judgment brought by
Officer Brown should lead the court to the same conclusion it would reach
if Officer Brown filed a motion to dismiss. 148 The results might differ,
however, if Officer Brown's 12(c) motion raises new factual information.
Then, absent a concession by the plaintiff regarding the truth of the de-
fendant's allegations, the court should deny the defendant's motion for
judgment on the pleading. 149 Furthermore, if the defendant were to raise
factual information upon which the qualified immunity defense depended
and the plaintiff disputed the defendant's allegations, then the defen-
dant's argument would move from the law-based category of arguments to
the fact-dependent category and should be treated as a motion for sum-
mary judgment.
C. Summary Judgment and Trial
The Court has indicated on several occasions that trial judges can and
should resolve qualified immunity disputes at the summary judgment
stage and, when possible, before discovery. 150 This directive ignores both
the purpose and form of summary judgment.
The primary purpose of civil jury trials is to resolve factual disputes. 15 1
Summary judgment serves a related function. As the Supreme Court
noted in Celotex v. Catrett,152 "[o] ne of the principal purposes of the sum-
mary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported
claims or defenses .... 1,,53 In short, summary judgment is intended to
148. See generally id. (explaining significant number of federal courts have
held same standard should apply).
149. See 5C CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 1370 (3d ed. 1998) ("In considering motions under Federal Rule
12(c), district courts frequently indicate that a party moving for ajudgment on the
pleadings impliedly admits the truth of its adversary's allegations and the falsity of
its own assertions that have been denied by that adversary.").
150. See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 195 (2001) ("[T]he goal of quali-
fied immunity to avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolu-
tion of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment."); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S.
158, 178-79 (1992) ("And so I see no reason that the trial judge may not resolve a
summary judgment motion premised on such a good-faith defense, just as we have
encouraged trial judges to do with respect to qualified immunity claims."); Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982) (abandoning subjective element of quali-
fied immunity defense to avoid excessive disruption of government and to permit
resolution of insubstantial claims on summary judgment).
151. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973) ("[T]he purpose of the
jury trial in criminal cases [is] to prevent government oppression and, in criminal
and civil cases, to assure a fair and equitable resolution of factual issues.
(citation omitted)).
152. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
153. See id. at 323-24 (discussing moving for summary judgment without sup-
porting affidavits). Stated bluntly, summary judgment "is the 'put up or shut up'
moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would
convince a trier of fact to accept its version of events." See Schacht v. Wis. Dep't of
Corrs., 175 F.3d 497, 504 (7th Cir. 1999).
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determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and, if so, civil
trials are designed to resolve those disputes. When it is apparent that
there is not a genuine issue of material fact, as is the case in law-based
qualified immunity claims, trial and summaryjudgment (both pre-discov-
ery and post-discovery) seem ill-suited tools with which to resolve cases. 1 54
Both summary judgment dispositions and trials are structured around
the parties' evidentiary burdens. Where, as here, the defendant pursues a
law-based qualified immunity claim procedural tools that depend upon
the assignment of evidentiary burdens are problematic in at least two re-
spects. First, absent a factual dispute, evidentiary burdens are inapplicable
and it is senseless to assign them to the parties in this type of scenario.
155
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, the assignment of "eviden-
tiary" burdens in law-based qualified immunity claims ignores Supreme
Court precedent on the issue.
In Elder, the plaintiff brought a § 1983 suit against several officers af-
ter he sustained permanent injuries during the course of a warrantless
arrest. 156 The officers pled qualified immunity, arguing that at the time of
the plaintiffs arrest, it was not clearly established that ordering suspects
from their homes to execute an arrest was a deprivation of their Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
1 57
Although the plaintiff cited to several cases which, he argued, should have
notified the officers that their actions would deprive him of a clearly estab-
lished Fourth Amendment right, the district court held that the law was
not clearly established and the defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity.158
154. But see 1OA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE & PROCEDURE § 2725 (3d ed. 1998) (claiming that if there is no genuine issue
of material fact, Rule 56(c) allows for immediate disposition). The difficulty of
this position is that it assumes there are only two types of questions-questions of
law and questions of fact. While it is true that "when the only issues to be decided
in the case are issues of law, summaryjudgment may be granted," it does not nec-
essarily follow that if the absence of questions of facts means that there are only
questions of law and summary judgment is appropriate-issues of law application
may remain. Id. Furthermore, the authors' conclusion does not seem to consider
either the structure or purpose of summary judgment, which, as noted above, fo-
cuses largely on factual disputes and evidentiary burdens.
155. SeeElderv. Holloway, 975 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 510 U.S.
510 (1994) (exploring plaintiff's role in responding to requests for qualified im-
munity). In Elder, the Ninth Circuit held that "in opposing an official's request for
judgment based on qualified immunity, the plaintiffs burden includes identifying
the universe of relevant statutory or decisional law from which the court can deter-
mine whether the right allegedly violated was clearly established." Id. at 1393. The
Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit's judgment, holding that
appellate courts should consider relevant precedents, even if the parties and the
district court failed to identify them. See Elder, 510 U.S. at 516 (reversing Ninth
Circuit judgment).
156. See Elder, 510 U.S. at 516.
157. See id.
158. See id. (holding that if law is not clearly established qualified immunity
does not apply).
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Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, the district court and presumably the
defendants, the Ninth Circuit had decided a similar case, Al-Azzawy, in
1985, two years before the plaintiff was injured. 159 In Al-Azzawy, the Ninth
Circuit held that officers who arrested the plaintiff outside of the plain-
tiffs home after ordering him to come out had, for all practical purposes,
"arrested [him] inside his residence without a warrant." 160 Although Al-
Azzawy "clearly established" that officers could not circumvent the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement by ordering suspects to come out of
their homes, the court reasoned that a § 1983 "plaintiffs burden in re-
sponding to a request for judgment based on qualified immunity is to
identify the universe of statutory or decisional law from which the [dis-
trict] court can determine whether the right allegedly violated was clearly
established."' 6 1 Accordingly, under the appellate court's opinion in Elder,
if plaintiffs fail to identify potentially relevant case law, they have not met
their "burden of showing that the constitutional right purportedly violated
was clearly established at the time of the official's conduct" and the defen-
dant is entitled to qualified immunity. 1
62
Approximately three years later, the Supreme Court unanimously re-
versed the Ninth Circuit's decision.16 3 The Court noted that "w hether an
asserted federal right was clearly established at a particular time, so that a
public official who allegedly violated the right has no qualified immunity
from suit, presents a question of law, not one of 'legal facts."1 64 Although
the Court does not explicitly address evidentiary burdens in § 1983 quali-
fied immunity disputes, the opinion implicitly suggests that it is improper
for trial courts to assign evidentiary burdens in law-based qualified immu-
nity claims.
Despite the implications of Elder, lower courts continue to assign the
parties evidentiary burdens in qualified immunity disputes-even in scena-
rios like this, where the defendant pursues a law-based qualified immunity
argument. 1 65 One explanation for lower courts' tendency to speak in
159. See United States v. AI-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding
that warrantless arrest and search of residence were justified by exigent
circumstances).
160. See id. at 893 (explaining defendant's arrest inside his residence).
161. SeeElderv. Holloway, 975 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 510 U.S.
510 (1994) (exploring plaintiff's role in responding to requests for qualified
immunity).
162. See Elder, 510 U.S. at 516 (evaluating defendant's entitlement to qualified
immunity).
163. 163 See id. at 511 (concluding that appellate court must produce "legal
facts" demonstrating law was clearly established).
164. Id. (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985); Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) ("On summaryjudgment, the judge appropriately
may determine, not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law was
clearly established at the time an action occurred.").
165. See, e.g., Douglas v. Dobs, 419 F.3d 1097, 1101 (10th Cir. 2005) ("A plain-
tiff may not simply allege a Fourth Amendment violation in the abstract, but must
demonstrate through relevant prior cases that a defendant's actions 'in a more
35
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terms of evidentiary burdens, even when the facts are not in dispute, is
that they are trying to force qualified immunity disputes into a summary
judgment mold. Summary judgment is structured around the evidentiary
burdens the parties will bear at trial.' 6 6
In the absence of evidentiary burdens, it is unclear how courts are to
structure summary judgment proceedings. Accordingly, courts "adopt" ev-
identiary burdens even when the facts are not in dispute to conform to the
structure of summary judgment. Arguably, this jimmying of law-based
qualified immunity disputes to fit into a summary judgment mold indi-
cates that summary judgment is not the best tool to resolve this type of
qualified immunity dispute. For the aforementioned reasons, summary
judgment, either before or after discovery, is a poor tool to resolve "law-
based" qualified immunity disputes. 16 7 It is, however, well suited for reso-
lution of "fact-dependent" qualified immunity claims.
SCENARIO 2: THE FACT-DEPENDENT QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
ARGUMENT
The plaintiff alleges that the defendant violated the Fourth
Amendment by unreasonably arresting him instead of his
brother. The plaintiff alleges that he is 5'3", has brown eyes and
black hair, and weighs approximately 135 pounds. He claims
that, in contrast, his fraternal twin brother is 6'3", has blue eyes,
bleach blonde hair, and weighs approximately 200 pounds. In
short, the plaintiff claims that he and his brother do not resem-
ble one another and, accordingly, it was unreasonable for the
defendant to mistake him for his brother. The defendant, how-
ever, claims that he is entitled to qualified immunity because he
reasonably mistook the plaintiff for his brother, who was wanted
in Florida. More specifically, the defendant claims that, due to a
clerical mix up, the plaintiff's picture was attached to the sus-
pect's file and he reasonably believed the person pictured, the
plaintiff, was the suspect he sought to arrest. (For the purposes
particularized sense' constitute a violation of a constitutional right." (quoting Bros-
seau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198-99 (2004))).
166. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986):
Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate
time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.
Id.
167. Should courts insist on resolving law-based qualified immunity disputes
as summaryjudgment they should structure the proceedings as they would if they
were resolving a qualified immunity dispute pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) or Rule
12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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of this scenario, assume that the plaintiff admits that he was not
ordered from the house and that he left voluntarily). 168
The second broad category of qualified immunity arguments depend,
in large part, upon the factual information the defendant alleges to have
had at the time of the incident. As discussed in greater detail in Part II of
this Article, fact-dependent qualified immunity arguments are particularly
thorny when the plaintiff alleges a violation of a Fourth Amendment
right.1 69 The Court's holdings in both Anderson and Saucier, nevertheless,
seem to suggest that a search or seizure may be unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment standard but reasonable under the qualified immu-
nity standard. 170 So, for the academic purpose of this Article, we will as-
sume the plaintiff has established the underlying Fourth Amendment
violation and concentrate solely on the qualified immunity dispute.
Where, as here, the court's determination will depend upon the de-
fendant's allegations, it would be inappropriate for the court to grant the
defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis of a qualified immunity de-
fense. 171 It is also unlikely that ajudgment on the pleadings will be appro-
168. If the plaintiff voluntarily left the house, the primary issues in determin-
ing whether the seizure violated the Fourth Amendment is whether it was reasona-
ble for Officer Brown to believe that Tim Smith was his fraternal twin brother Jim
Smith.
169. The fact-dependent qualified immunity argument is often more compli-
cated than the law-dependent argument for two reasons. First, the relevant factual
allegations will be contained in the defendant's pleadings, not the plaintiffs com-
plaint. This means that the court cannot simply accept the plaintiff s allegations as
true and base its qualified immunity determination on those "facts." The second
related difficulty is that the court is now faced with two factual scenarios, which
may lead to a factual dispute (a problem averted in the law-based qualified immu-
nity argument outlined in Scenario 1). Furthermore, because the defendant's en-
titlement to a qualified immunity claim may depend upon the veracity of his or her
allegations as compared to plaintiff's allegations, resolution of the qualified immu-
nity may require trial, or at a minimum, discovery. In short, when confronted with
fact-dependent qualified immunity arguments, courts may not simply "link" the
plaintiffs allegations to the legal rule to determine whether the defendant is enti-
tled to qualified immunity, as it could in a law-based argument. Instead, the court
may have to make factual determinations before it can reach the law application
step.
170. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 203 (2001) (citing Anderson v. Creigh-
ton, 483 U.S. 632, 641 (1987)) ("In Anderson, a warrantless search case, we rejected
the argument that there is no distinction between the reasonableness standard for
warrantless searches and the qualified immunity inquiry.").
171. Trial courts should only grant a defendant's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
when it is clear from the plaintiffs complaint (and attached documents) that the
plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For a discus-
sion of when it is appropriate for a 12(b) (6) motion to be granted, see supra notes
109-24.
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priate. 1 72 Summary judgment is the next available pre-trial disposition
option.
173
As discussed in Part C of Scenario 1, summary judgment differs from
motions to dismiss and motions on the pleadings in both its purpose and
structure. Summary judgment is structured around the evidentiary bur-
dens the parties will bear at trial. 1 74 Although the use of summary judg-
ment for the resolution of "law-based" qualified immunity claims is
suspect, where, as here, the outcome is dependent upon the veracity of the
defendant's allegations, summary judgment is a more preferable form of
pre-trial resolution than both Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c). The court will, how-
ever, need to assign evidentiary burdens. This leads to the third goal of
this Article: determining what party courts should assign evidentiary bur-
dens in fact-dependent qualified immunity disputes.
When confronted with a "fact-dependent" qualified immunity argu-
ment at the summary judgment stage (both before and after discovery has
taken place), the circuits are divided regarding which party bears the evi-
dentiary burden. For example, in Michalik v. Hermann,i 7 5 the defendant's
qualified immunity claim was based upon facts not contained in the plain-
tiff's pleadings (the plaintiff also disputed the defendant's factual allega-
tions). 17 6 Nevertheless, the court agreed that the " usual summary
172. See generally 5C CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1368, at 253-54 (4th ed. 2004) (outlining practice
under Rule 12(c)). A material issue of fact that will prevent a motion under Rule
12(c) from being successful may be framed by an express conflict on a particular
point between the parties' respective pleadings. Id. It also may result from the
defendant pleading a new matter and affirmative defenses in his or her answer. Id.
Judgment pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is only an
appropriate form of resolution when the parties agree upon the material facts. Id.
Where, as here, the defendant seeks to introduce facts in addition to those con-
tained in the plaintiff s complaint it will be unlikely (or at a minimum unwise) for
the plaintiff to agree with the defendant's version of the facts. Id. To survive a
motion for judgment on the pleadings when the defendant makes a "fact-depen-
dent" qualified immunity claim, the plaintiff only needs to dispute the defendant's
version of the facts-the plaintiff does not even need to offer evidence which con-
tradicts the defendant's allegations. Id.
173. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998) (claiming that sum-
maryjudgment is "ultimate screen to weed out truly insubstantial lawsuits prior to
trial"). This is likely to be a post-discovery motion for summary judgment. Id. at
598. The court noted that "[i]f the plaintiff's action survives [a motion to dismiss]
... the plaintiff ordinarily will be entitled to some discovery." Id.
174. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (explaining
importance of evidentiary burdens borne by parties at trial). In Celotex, the Court
explained:
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of sum-
mary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the exis-
tence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.
Id.
175. 422 F.3d 252 (5th Cir. 2005).
176. See id. at 254-57.
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judgment burden of proof is altered in the case of a qualified immunity
defense. An officer need only plead his good faith, which then shifts the
burden to the plaintiff, who must rebut the defense by establishing that
the officer's allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established
law."' 77 In contrast, the Tenth Circuit has described the evidentiary bur-
dens of qualified immunity as follows:
When a defendant raises a claim of qualified immunity, the bur-
den shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant is not enti-
tled to immunity. To overcome a qualified immunity defense, a
plaintiff must first assert a violation of a constitutional or statu-
tory right and then show that the right was clearly established
.... Once the plaintiff satisfies this initial two-part burden, the
burden shifts to the defendant to show that there are no genuine
issues of material fact and that defendant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
1 78
If courts are to resolve fact-dependent qualified immunity disputes at
the summary judgment stage, they must first determine which party will
bear the burden of proof and production at trial. 179 As a general rule, the
burden of proof "follows" the burden of pleading.' 8 0 Accordingly, the
177. Id. at 262 (citation omitted).
178. Robbins v. Wilkie, 433 F.3d 755, 764 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
179. See Christopher David Lee, Note, Summaiy Judgment in New Mexico follow-
ing Bartlett v. Mirabel, 33 N.M. L. REV. 503, 510 (2003) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at
331 (Brennan, J., dissenting)) ("A threshold question in the summary judgment
process regards whether the party seeking summary judgment will bear the burden
of persuasion at trial.").
180. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 337 (2d ed. 1972) (discussing relationship
between burden of proof and burden of pleading). Closely related to this rule is
the premise that the burden of proof depends upon "whether a particular material
element is part of plaintiff's prima facie case or a defense." Edward W. Cleary,
Presuming and Pleading: An Essay onjuristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5, 8 (1959).
As Cleary explained:
[T]he responsibility for dealing with every element is not placed on the
plaintiff. Instead we settle for a 'prima facie case' or 'cause of action,'
consisting of certain selected elements which are regarded as sufficient to
entitle plaintiff to recover, if he proves them and unless defendant in
turn establishes other elements that would offset them.
Id. at 7.
Herein lies at least part of the difficulty with the affirmative defense of quali-
fied immunity. The Court has held that a § 1983 plaintiffs prima facie case con-
sists of just two elements: (1) deprivation of a federally protected right (2)
deprivation of that right must be by a person acting under color of state law. See
Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). Proof that a reasonable officer would
have recognized the illegality of the conduct in question is not a part of a plaintiff's
case-in-chief. Id. Therefore, under this method of determination, it seems inap-
propriate to require the plaintiff to prove that a reasonable officer would have
realized that the arrest was unreasonable. See Chen, supra note 5, at 96-97
("[A]ssignment of the burden of persuasion to the plaintiff would have serious
legal ramifications. It is at least clear that assigning the burden to the plaintiff
would mean that she must prove more than she would in order to prevail on the
2007]
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party who bears the burden of pleading a particular issue traditionally
bears the burden of proving that issue. This is a fairly straightforward
method so long as there is precedent determining which party bears the
burden of pleading. There are, however, exceptions to this general
rule.18
1
Given Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion in Gomez and the Su-
preme Court's discussions of qualified immunity, qualified immunity may
be one such exception. In Gomez, the Supreme Court held that because
qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the bur-
den of pleading.11 2 When Justice Rehnquist joined the Court's opinion,
however, he specifically noted that, as he read it, the majority opinion only
addressed the burden of pleading and "[left] open the issue of the burden
of persuasion."1
83
Although the Court has referenced Gomez since Harlow,184 the lan-
guage the Court uses in several qualified immunity cases suggests that the
plaintiff, not the defendant, bears the evidentiary burdens.1 8 5 For exam-
merits."). Equally problematic, the Court has indicated that qualified immunity is
more than a defense. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (discussing
potential uses of qualified immunity). Combined, these holdings suggest that
qualified immunity is not easily classified as part of a plaintiff's case-in-chief or as
an affirmative defense. Id. Accordingly, this method does not unequivocally re-
solve which party should bear the burden of proof on this issue.
181. See Mitchell Green, Note, Qualified Immunity for Public Officials Under Sec-
tion 1983 in the Fifth Circuit, 60 TEX. L. REv. 127, 133 (1981) ("The burden of proof
may diverge from the burden of pleading for such reasons asjudicial convenience,
general considerations of fairness, or public policy.").
182. See Gomez, 446 U.S. at 640 (1980).
183. Id. at 642.
184. See, e.g., Bloom v. Town of New Windsor Police Dep't, No. 00-7430, 2000
WL 1654752, at *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 3, 2000) (referencing Gomez for proposition that
plaintiff must prove right was violated by person acting under color of state or
territorial law); Finley v. Giacobbe, 79 F.3d 1285, 1296 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Gomez
for requirement that plaintiff show right violated by government entity); Walentas
v. Lipper, 862 F.2d 414, 418 (2d Cir. 1988) (explaining that plaintiff must allege
that individual acting under state or territorial law violated right that is secured by
Constitution or laws of United States). Some scholars argue that Gomez's reasoning
is no longer applicable because Gomez was decided before the Court revamped the
qualified immunity test in Harlow. See, e.g., 4 RONALD D. ROTUNDA &JOHN E. No-
WAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 19.30 (3d ed.
1999). The authors offer the following observations and arguments regarding the
"burden of proof" in § 1983 qualified immunity cases:
Gomez relied on the rationale that qualified immunity was based on sub-
jective factors which a plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to know.
This rationale is no longer applicable since Harlow v. Fitzgerald, which fo-
cused only on objective factors. However, Harlow reaffirmed, without dis-
cussion, the Gomez rule that the burden of pleading qualified immunity is
on the defendant.
Id.
185. See, e.g., Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 (1984) ("A plaintiff who seeks
damages for violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defen-
dant official's qualified immunity only by showing that those rights were clearly
established at the time of the conduct at issue.").
[Vol. 52: p. 135
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pie, in Davis v. Scherer,'86 the Court noted that "[a] plaintiff who seeks
damages for violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome
the defendant official's qualified immunity only by showing that those
rights were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.' 87 Al-
though the Court explained in Elder that Davis does not require the plain-
tiff to identify relevant case law to "defeat" a defendant's qualified
immunity claim, Supreme Court cases do not explicitly state which party
bears the burden. 188 In fact, cases decided after Elder continue to suggest
that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof in qualified immunity dis-
putes. 189 Thus, the "proof follows pleading" rule seems to be an unrelia-
ble method for determining evidentiary burdens in fact-dependent
qualified immunity disputes.190
When courts choose to deviate from the general rule that proof fol-
lows pleading, they often cite policy, probability and fairness considera-
tions as justifications for their decision. 191 Nevertheless, even when one
considers these three factors, it still seems more appropriate that the de-
fendant bear the evidentiary burdens in qualified immunity disputes.
186. 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
187. Id.
188. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 515 (1994) (explaining that Ninth Cir-
cuit misconstrued Davis).
189. See NAHMOD, supra note 57, § 8.19 (discussing burden of proof).
190. But see Richard A. Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U. CHI. L. REv.
556, 573 (1973) (analyzing "proof follows pleading" presumption). Legal scholars
and courts have also employed the "affirmative form method" to decide which
party should carry the evidentiary burden. Id. Under this method, "the party with
the affirmative side of an issue [is] required to plead [and prove] it." Id. This
method, however, has been criticized as "no more than a play on words." See
Cleary, supra note 180, at 11 (criticizing affirmative form method). The qualified
immunity doctrine tends to verify this criticism. Id. Depending upon the level of
specificity at which a court identifies the qualified immunity issue, courts can prop-
erly frame the issue of qualified immunity in any of the following ways: (1) The
defendant must prove entitlement to qualified immunity; (2) The plaintiff must
prove that the law was clearly established; (3) The defendant must prove that a
reasonable official could believe the defendant's actions were lawful. Id. Each of
these statements is an accurate description of qualified immunity and each is in
the affirmative form. Id. Accordingly, if one were to apply the "affirmative form
method," assignment of the evidentiary burden would vary depending on how one
frames the inquiry. In the end, this method provides little in the way of guidance
as to which party should bear the burden of production and persuasion. Even
Epstein, one of the leading proponents of the affirmative form method, admits
that there are "some cases that create difficulties for this formal test." See Epstein,
supra, at 576 (admitting potential difficulties in using affirmative form method).
191. See Cleary, supra note 180, at 11 (noting that court considers factors such
as policy, fairness and probability when assigning burden); Green, supra note 181,
at 133 (discussing shift of burden of proof and how courts can diverge from proof
follows pleading rule); see also 2 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 337, at 415 (John W.
Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) ("[T]here is no key principle governing the apportion-
ment of the burdens of proof. Their allocation, either initially or ultimately, will
depend upon the weight that is given to any one or more of several factors ....").
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Neither policy nor probability seems to suggest that one party is bet-
ter suited to shoulder the burden of proof. "Policy" refers to any special
considerations indicating which party should bear the evidentiary bur-
den. 192 With regard to qualified immunity, it is difficult to determine
whether policy considerations would favor placing evidentiary burdens on
the plaintiff or the defendant. The Court in Harlow stated:
The recognition of a qualified immunity defense for high execu-
tives reflect[s] an attempt to balance competing values: not only
the importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of citi-
zens, but also "the need to protect officials who are required to
exercise their discretion and the related public interest in en-
couraging the vigorous exercise of official authority."
19 3
Because qualified immunity is intended to balance multiple interests,
it seems a bit glib to suggest that policy considerations favor assigning one
party evidentiary burdens as opposed to the other.
194
Similarly, attempting to decide which party should bear the burden of
proof by applying the "probability factor" is an exercise in futility. The
probability factor is "a judicial, i.e., wholly non-statistical, estimate of the
probabilities of the situation, with the burden being put on the party who
will be benefited by a departure from the supposed norm." 19 5 Stated a bit
more simply, when assigning evidentiary burdens on the basis of
"probability," 'judges will often assign the burden of proof to the party
seeking to establish the least-likely scenario." 196 Accordingly, if one be-
lieves that government officials did not knowingly violate the law, then the
burden should be on the plaintiff.19 7 If, however, one believes that rea-
sonably competent public officials will know the law and recognize when
their behavior violates constitutionally permissible standards, then the bur-
den of proof should be on the defendant. 9 8
192. See MCCORMICK, supra note 191, at 415 (allocating burdens of proof).
193. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 800 (1982) (quoting Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)).
194. But see Carey, supra note 32, at 1570. Carey notes:
[T]he policy rationale strongly supports placing the burden of proof on
the plaintiff. The Harlow Court's concern that 'insubstantial lawsuits un-
dermine the effectiveness of government as contemplated by our consti-
tutional structure,' coupled with the Court's hope that the lower courts
could resolve many of these claims on summary judgment, places a civil
rights plaintiff in the position of advancing a 'disfavored contention.'
Id.
195. Cleary, supra note 180, at 12-13.
196. Marshall S. Sprung, Note, Taking Sides: The Burden of Proof Switch in Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1301, 1308 (1996) (analyzing burden of proof
switch in Dolan).
197. See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (presenting question
of degree of immunity granted to defendant police officer).
198. See Carey, supra note 32, at 1569 ("[T]he probability rationale ... would
presume that public officials know their constitutional duties and are responsible
for constitutional violations occurring as a result of their actions."). "Once a pub-
[Vol. 52: p. 135
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Thus, the only remaining factor to be considered is fairness, which
tends to indicate that the defendant should bear the evidentiary burdens
on this particular issue. 199 Fairness reflects the idea that the party with
superior access to the evidence should be assigned the burden of proof.200
Given the nature of the argument in Scenario 2, requiring the defendant
to bear the evidentiary burden completely comports with fairness. 20 ' Fact-
dependent qualified immunity claims hinge upon the defendant's under-
standing of the facts at the time of the alleged deprivation. Between
plaintiffs and defendants, defendants are surely in a better position
to offer evidence of the facts upon which they relied when assessing
the legality of their conduct.20 2 Thus, fairness (and in this respect,
lic official has shown that he was acting within the scope of his duties, the public
official also should bear the onus of proving the exception to the rule." Id.
199. See Dale A. Nance, Civility and the Burden of Proof 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'V 647, 662 (1994) ("[T]he focus on disturbance of the status quo may help
explain many burdens placed upon plaintiffs (and counter-claimants), but it leaves
affirmative defenses wholly untouched."). Courts may also allocate burdens based
upon which party is attempting to alter the status quo-with the burden being
assigned to the party seeking change. Id. This consideration, however, is inappli-
cable here.
200. See Cleary, supra note 180, at 12.
201. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1980) (holding that defen-
dant, not plaintiff, has distinct ability to know facts which determine whether im-
munity has been established). But see Carey, supra note 32, at 1569 (examining
how assigning burden to plaintiff comports with fairness). Carey asserts the follow-
ing: "The fairness rationale supports placing the burden on the plaintiffs. Because
Harlow generally has stripped away subjective considerations from the Wood v.
Strickland test for qualified immunity, any special access a defendant official might
have to subjective evidence concerning his state of mind ought to have less rele-
vance." Id. This argument suffers from the same mistakes that are so common
within this doctrine. First, this view does not distinguish between the two types of
arguments that a defendant may advance when asserting qualified immunity-the
law-based qualified immunity claim and the fact-based qualified immunity argu-
ment. But, this deficiency may be attributed to the Note's publication date-the
Court did not decide Anderson v. Creighton until 1987, two years after the note was
published. The position fails because it does not recognize that the specific issue it
is addressing-whether the law was "clearly established"-does not depend on
truth of the matter asserted and, accordingly, it is inappropriate to assign either
party the burdens of production or persuasion. There are no facts to be
determined.
202. See Gomez, 446 U.S. at 640-41 (comparing ability of plaintiff and defen-
dant to offer evidence that they relied in assessing legality of their conduct). Ex-
plaining the Court's decision in Gomez, Justice Marshall writes:
Our conclusion as to the allocation of the burden of pleading is sup-
ported by the nature of the qualified immunity defense. As our decisions
make clear, whether such immunity has been established depends on
facts peculiarly within the knowledge and control of the defendant. Thus
we have stated that "[i]t is the existence of reasonable grounds for the
belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled
with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of exec-
utive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct." The
applicable test focuses not only on whether the official has an objectively
reasonable basis for that belief, but also on whether "[t]he official himself
[is] acting sincerely and with a belief that he is doing right." There may
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be no way for a plaintiff to know in advance whether the official has such
a belief or, indeed, whether he will even claim that he does. The exis-
tence of a subjective belief will frequently turn on factors which a plaintiff
cannot reasonably be expected to know. For example, the official's belief
may be based on state or local law, advice of counsel, administrative prac-
tice, or some other factor of which the official alone is aware. To impose
the pleading burden on the plaintiff would ignore this elementary fact
and be contrary to the established practice in analogous areas of the law.
Id. (internal citations omitted). The Court seems particularly concerned with the
qualified immunity's subjective prong (which Harlow later eliminated). Yet, the
Court's reasoning is equally applicable to fact-dependent qualified immunity
claims. As the Court notes, "the official's belief may be based on state or local law,
advice of counsel, administrative practice, or some other factor of which the offi-
cial alone is aware." Id. Although Harlow eliminated the subjective prong of the
good faith qualified immunity inquiry, Anderson makes clear that the inquiry is fact-
specific. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S 635, 641 (1987). Accordingly, each of
these examples would still be relevant under Harlow's objective test and it contin-
ues to comport with ideas of fairness (and common sense) that the defendant
should bear the burden of proof when the defense depends upon factual allega-
tions to which the plaintiff is not privy (at least in the absence of discovery).
Harlow's extraordinary circumstances prong also tends to support the conclu-
sion that the defendant should bear the burden of production and persuasion in
fact-dependent qualified immunity disputes. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 819 (1982). In Harlow, the Justices held that government officials are not
liable for monetary damages when they are able to prove that, although the law
was "clearly established," as a result of extraordinary circumstances, they neither
knew nor should have known that their actions would deprive the plaintiff of a
protected right. Id. at 818-19. Mostjudges and legal scholars who have considered
the issue agree that the defendant should bear the burden of establishing ex-
traordinary circumstances. See, e.g., NAHMOD, supra note 57, § 8.19 ("There is one
situation in which it is surely appropriate to speak about an evidentiary burden of
proof to be imposed on the defendant: where there is clearly settled law and the
defendant claims extraordinary circumstances justifying his or her failure to know
and comply with it.").
The uniformity of opinion regarding evidentiary burdens when the defen-
dant's qualified immunity claim is based upon extraordinary circumstances may be
the result of Harlow's language, policy considerations or some combination of the
two. In Harlow, the Court explicitly states, "if [in] the official pleading the defense
claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither knew nor should
have known of the relevant legal standard, the defense should be sustained." 457
U.S. at 819. The decision to assign the defendant the evidentiary burden in this
circumstance may also be attributable to the nature of the evidence. Id. As dis-
cussed in the preceding pages, considerations of fairness (and probability and pol-
icy to the degree that they implicate fairness) suggest that the defendant should
bear the evidentiary burden when raising a "fact-dependent" qualified immunity
argument. Between the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant is in a better
position to know and prove "extraordinary circumstances." It is also in the defen-
dant's best interests to do so.
Furthermore, requiring the defendant to bear the burden of proof when seek-
ing qualified immunity on the basis of a mistake of fact is consistent with the lan-
guage of Anderson. See 483 U.S. at 641 ("The principles of qualified immunity that
we reaffirm today require that Anderson be permitted to argue that he is entitled
to summary judgment . . ").
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policy) 20 3 indicates that defendants should bear the burden of proof on
this particular claim.
2 ° 4
With that said, many scholars argue that the burden of proof is sel-
dom important in civil cases.20 5 The argument has been explained as
follows:
[T] he outcome of the litigation often depends less on the alloca-
tion of the burden of proof than on whether it is plaintiff or de-
fendant who presents a stronger case on key issues. Regardless of
whether plaintiff or defendant has the burden of proof on con-
tributory negligence, for example, plaintiff will present evidence
and attempt to convince the fact finder that she was not negli-
gent, and defendant will present his proof in an attempt to con-
vince the fact finder that plaintiff was negligent.20 6
This argument is logical. Take, for example, the case of Smith v.
Brown as described in the second scenario. The plaintiff alleges in his
complaint that it was unreasonable for Officer Brown to mistake him for
his brother, who was wanted in Florida, because the two men have very
different appearances. Officer Brown, however, claims that he is entitled
203. There is often a great deal of overlap among policy, probability and fair-
ness. See Cleary, supra note 180, at 11 ("Much overlap is apparent, as sound policy
implies not too great a departure from fairness, and probability may constitute an
aspect of both policy and fairness.").
204. See Chen, supra note 5, at 96-97 (addressing burdens of qualified immu-
nity). Chen offers an additional compelling reason why courts should hesitate to
assign plaintiffs the burdens of production and persuasion on issues of qualified
immunity:
Assignment of the burden of persuasion to the plaintiff would have seri-
ous legal ramifications. It is at least clear that assigning the burden to the
plaintiff would mean that she must prove more than she would in order
to prevail on the merits .... This covert transformation of substantive
constitutional law would both be unfair and create substantial inequali-
ties in constitutional law enforcement. Moreover, the alteration of sub-
stantive law in this manner would occur subversively because it would be
achieved at a sub-doctrinal level. The subtle change occasioned by allocat-
ing the burden of persuasion to the plaintiff would not consciously be
acknowledged in the substantive constitutional law. Furthermore, putting
the persuasion burden on the plaintiff would make overcoming the im-
munity defense an element of plaintiff's case-in-chief, which arguably
conflicts with the Court's holding in Gomez v. Toledo that qualified immu-
nity is an affirmative defense.
Id.
205. See, e.g.,JAMES W. McELHANEY, MCELHANEY'S TRIAL NOTEBOOK 493-95 (2d
ed. 1987) ("[F]or the most part the burden of proof does not make much differ-
ence in the outcome of the case."); Edmund M. Morgan, Some Observations Concern-
ing Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. REv. 906, 911 (1931) ("The location of the burden of
persuasion is important at only one stage of the trial, and then only in a situation
which seldom occurs-namely, when at the close of evidence the mind of the trier
of fact is in equilibrium upon the issue.").
206. Lee, supra note 91, at 11 (addressing overstated importance of burden of
proof on actual outcome of given case).
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to qualified immunity because, given the information in his possession at
the time of plaintiffs arrest, it was reasonable for him to believe that the
plaintiff was his brother.20 7 Although it is clearly the defendant's burden
to plead qualified immunity, at summary judgment and/or trial, the plain-
tiff will introduce evidence that it was unreasonable for Officer Brown to
believe that he was wanted for arrest.20 8 Meanwhile, the defendant will
produce evidence to prove that a reasonable officer in his position would
believe that the plaintiff was actually his brother.209 In short, regardless of
which party bears the burden of proof, both parties will introduce evi-
dence to support their position. From this, many legal scholars have con-
cluded that evidentiary burdens are only outcome determinative when
neither party is able to produce evidence on a particular material issue or
in "close cases."210 This argument, however, focuses almost entirely on
the burden of production.
2 11
The burden of persuasion is equally, if not more important, than the
burden of production, particularly in cases where the outcome requires
resolution of a mixed question of law and fact. In most civil cases, the
party bearing the burden of persuasion must prove its claim or defense by
a preponderance of the evidence. 2 12 The preponderance of the evidence
207. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 203 (2001) (citing Anderson, 483 U.S at
643) (noting distinction between "the reasonableness standard for warrantless
searches and the qualified immunity inquiry"). To establish a Fourth Amendment
violation, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's actions were objectively un-
reasonable. Arguably, the defendant's allegations, if true, would also prove that
there was not a Fourth Amendment violation. Supreme Court precedent, however,
indicates that a defendant may be entitled to qualified immunity even when the
court finds that the defendant violated the Fourth Amendment.
208. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (asserting that reasonable
officer would have recognized illegality of conduct in question and determined
that it was not part of plaintiff's case-in-chief).
209. See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 39 (Abridged 6th ed. 1991) (defining af-
firmative defense as "[a] defendant's assertion of facts and arguments that, if true,
will defeat the plaintiff's or prosecution's claim, even if all the allegations in the
complaint are true"). As is true with most affirmative defenses, the defendant does
not necessarily dispute the plaintiff's factual allegations. Instead, the defendant
wishes to introduce additional facts that prove that, under the circumstances, a
reasonable official would believe the arrest was lawful.
210. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 205, at 911 (presenting situations where evi-
dentiary burdens can become outcome determinative).
211. See id. (same).
212. See generally Ronald J. Allen & Robert A. Hillman, Evidentiay Problems
in-and Solutions for-the Uniform Commercial Code, 1984 DuKE L.J. 92, 95 (1984)
("In civil litigation, [the standard of proof] is normally a preponderance of the
evidence, but occasionally courts impose higher or lower standards."). Under a
preponderance of the evidence standard, the party bearing the burden of proof
must:
prove that something is more likely so than not so. In other words, a
preponderance of the evidence means such evidence as, when consid-
ered and compared with the evidence opposed to it, has more convincing
force, and produces in your minds belief that what is sought to be proved
is more likely true than not true.
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standard applicable in most civil cases reflects traditional set point theory.
Under this theory, " every variable x either has the property P or the prop-
erty not P... [e]verything is either a member of the set of red things or it
is not. Everything is either a member of the set of things divisible by two,
or it is not."2 13 Like set point theory, the preponderance of the evidence
standard gives jurists two choices, "something is more likely so than not
SO."214
Determinations of historical facts will typically fit into the binary struc-
ture upon which set point theory and the preponderance of the evidence
standard are based. For example, in Smith v. Brown the parties may dis-
pute whether Officer Brown ordered the plaintiff to come out of the
house or not. It is a yes or no question. Given their binary nature, dis-
putes over historical facts are well suited for the preponderance of the
evidence standard. Unfortunately, qualified immunity is not a question of
just fact but a mixed question of law and fact (or an example of law
application).
When determining the availability of qualified immunity by a prepon-
derance of the evidence standard (or, more generally, set point theory),
jurists must determine whether it is more likely than not that a reasonable
official would (or could) know that the alleged conduct was illegal. This
assumes that officials may be classified as reasonable or unreasonable.
Some conduct is clearly reasonable, while other conduct is clearly un-
reasonable.2 1 5 Most conduct, however, falls somewhere in the middle of
these two extremes. Accordingly, one might view reasonableness as a spec-
KEVIN F. O'MALLEY ET AL., 3 FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTION § 104.01 (5th
ed. 2000).
213. Charles M. Yablon, On the Allocation of Burdens of Proof in Corporate Law:
An Essay on Fairness and Fuzzy Sets, 13 CARDozo L. REv. 497, 510 (1991) (discussing
applicable burdens of proof in corporate law).
214. See O'MALLEY ET AL., supra note 212, § 104.01 (identifying choices availa-
ble to jurors under preponderance of evidence standard).
215. See Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 583, 590-91 (1998) (suggesting that entitlement to qualified immunity will
depend upon nature of underlying constitutional violation). Armacost explains:
Officials who make reasonable legal judgments that are later adjudicated
unconstitutional may not be sufficiently blameworthy to warrant the im-
position of constitutional damages liability. In such cases it is easy to see
why a defense of qualified immunity-excusing a failure to know the
law-would be available. The above-described rationale for qualified im-
munity only holds, however, when nothing else inherent in the defen-
dant's conduct or circumstances makes her behavior wrongful apart from
knowledge of illegality. This explains why qualified immunity often drops
out of the analysis when the underlying claim requires a showing of bad
intent, such as intentional racial discrimination or deliberate indifference
to a prisoner's serious medical needs. The argument that qualified im-
munity is unnecessary in such cases, however, is not based solely on the
intentionality of the official's conduct. It also rests on the notion that
conduct such as invidious racial discrimination contains indicia of its own
wrongfulness: Today, discrimination against someone because she is Afri-
can-American or Hispanic is viewed as inherently and obviously "bad" be-
2007]
47
Ravenell: Hammering in Screws: Why the Court Should Look beyond Summary Jud
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
trum with obviously reasonable behavior on one end and obviously unrea-
sonable behavior on the other. Like the colors in a color spectrum,
unreasonable and reasonable may blend together. Set point theory and
the preponderance of the evidence standard, however, recognize only two
categories-red and not red, reasonable or unreasonable. Because there
are only two choices, but a range of reasonable/unreasonable behavior,
many reasonableness determinations are difficult to classify. 2 16 Stated dif-
ferently, there is no bright line separating a reasonable official from an
unreasonable official. As a result, even if it is true that evidentiary burdens
are only outcome determinative in close cases, issues of law application,
like reasonableness, are more likely to give rise to close cases than are
determinations of historical fact. Accordingly, the burden of persuasion
plays an active role in cases requiring law application. Even if one disputes
this conclusion, it is impossible to ignore the integral role that evidentiary
burdens play in summary judgment proceedings.
D. Summary Judgment and the Fact-Dependent Qualified Immunity Claim
If I am correct, and the defendant does bear the burden of produc-
tion and persuasion when raising a "fact-dependent" qualified immunity
claim, courts are still faced with an additional problem when resolving
qualified immunity disputes at the summary judgment stage: The Su-
preme Court has never explicitly stated how trial courts should structure
summary judgment proceedings when the moving party bears the burden
of proof on the dispositive issue. Celotex, the seminal case discussing the
parties' burdens in summary judgment proceedings states:
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry
of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and
upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing suffi-
cient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial2 17
As Justice Brennan points out in his dissenting opinion, the structure
of summary judgment will differ if the party moving for summary judg-
ment would bear the burden of proof on the dispositive element at
trial.2 18 Justice Brennan explains:
havior, obviating the need for qualified immunity in a case alleging such
discrimination.
Id.
216. Continuing the color analogy, it is like asking someone to decide if a
shade of purple is red or blue.
217. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (emphasis added)
(analyzing effect of Rule 56(c)'s language).
218. See id. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining how burden assign-
ment can be outcome determinative at trial). Justice Brennan's conclusion is logi-
cal. Simply imagine summary judgment proceedings if the non-moving party were
required to demonstrate that there is "a genuine issue for trial," regardless of the
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If the moving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial,
that party must support its motion with credible evidence . . . that
would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial.
Such an affirmative showing shifts the burden of production to
the party opposing the motion and requires that party either to
produce evidentiary materials that demonstrate the existence of
a "genuine issue" for trial or to submit an affidavit requesting
additional time for discovery. 21 9
Both legal scholarship and appellate opinions seem to agree with Jus-
tice Brennan's assessment. 220 Accordingly, in Smith v. Brown the defendant
would be required to produce evidence (e.g., an affidavit from Officer
Brown) that, if proven, would demonstrate that a reasonable official in his
position would (or could) believe the conduct was lawful. This would shift
the burden to the plaintiff to produce evidence that there is a genuine
dispute of fact. If the defendant filed the motion before discovery, then
the plaintiff may request additional time in order to conduct discovery.
22 1
Conversely, in cases in which discovery has already taken place, the plain-
tiff must then produce evidence that shows there is a genuine dispute of
material fact.
2 2 2
The Court has defined a "genuine dispute of material fact" as a dis-
pute dealing with "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law ... [where] the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. '2 23 This standard raises a
unique issue in fact-dependent summary judgment disputes. Tradition-
ally, courts have considered reasonableness as a question for the jury.
Qualified immunity's "reasonable official" standard seems reminiscent of
the "reasonable man" standard employed in negligence law. Therefore, it
evidentiary burdens the parties would bear at trial. If this were true, the parties'
roles and evidentiary burdens at summary judgment would depend entirely upon
which party filed the motion. The moving party could temporarily shift the evi-
dentiary burdens that he or she would bear at trial to the non-moving party during
the summary judgment proceeding by simply being the first to file the motion.
Accordingly, it would be in every plaintiffs best interest to move for summaryjudg-
ment before the defendant did so. This would mean that the parties' burdens at
the summary judgment stage would reflect their burdens at trial.
219. Id. at 331 (addressing effect of assigning burden of persuasion to moving
party).
220. See Torres Vargas v. Santiago Cummings, 149 F.3d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 1998)
("The party who has the burden of proof on a dispositive issue cannot attain sum-
mary judgment unless the evidence that he provides on that issue is conclusive.");
Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986) (explaining that if
moving party has burden of proof in summary judgment proceeding, "his showing
must be sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find
other than for the moving party") (citation and emphasis omitted).
221. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (detailing situation
where additional discovery is permitted for plaintiff).
222. See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (same).
223. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
2007]
49
Ravenell: Hammering in Screws: Why the Court Should Look beyond Summary Jud
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007
VILI.ANOVA LAW REVIEW
would seem that facts suggesting that a defendant acted reasonably or un-
reasonably would be considered material and could preclude summary
judgment.22 4 Nevertheless, the court has specifically held that qualified
immunity is a question for the court. As a result, genuine disputes of ma-
terial facts should only arise in qualified immunity proceedings when the
parties offer contradictory evidence of a specific historical fact.
Returning to our fact pattern in Smith v. Brown, if the defendant
moves for summaryjudgment after the completion of discovery and offers
evidence that the plaintiffs picture was attached to the suspect's file, and,
in response, the plaintiff offers evidence that he and his brother do not
resemble each other, the court should still decide whether or not the de-
fendant is entitled to qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage
because there is no dispute of genuine fact. Instead, what the parties are
disputing is whether a reasonable official would know the defendant's con-
duct was illegal. Because the Court has indicated that this is a question for
the court, the trial judge should be able to determine the availability of
qualified immunity and dispose of the case at the summaryjudgment stage
if this is the only issue at bar.225 While this may be considered a question
for the jury (a.k.a. a question of fact) in some cases, for example tort cases,
it is considered a question for the court in qualified immunity disputes.
If, however, the plaintiff produces evidence that directly contradicts
this historical point (for example, an affidavit from the person in charge
of the files), the court should deny summary judgment so that the jury
may make a factual determination regarding whether the plaintiffs pic-
ture was attached to the file upon which the defendant relied. Accord-
ingly, the parties will have to proceed to trial to resolve the case.
226
224. The jury would have to consider both sets of facts and decide whether
the defendant's behavior was reasonable or unreasonable.
225. This is not to suggest that a court would necessarily grant the defendant
summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, it simply means that the
court can decide the qualified immunity issue at this stage. If the court denies the
defendant's motion, a trial would be necessary to decide the underlying constitu-
tional issue.
226. See NAHMOD, supra note 57, § 8.08 (noting that some trial courts use spe-
cial interrogatories to resolve fact-dependent qualified immunity disputes that
make it to trial). Appellate courts are divided with respect to the roles of the judge
and the jury in qualified immunity disputes that reach trial. Professor Nahmod
describes the division as follows:
If there remain issues of fact in dispute relating to qualified immunity,
there are two options. In at least one circuit, the trial court still decides
whether the defendant violated clearly settled law. In other circuits, the
trial court denies the motion for directed verdict and instructs the jury on
qualified immunity in the alternative as follows: if the jury finds the facts
one way, then it must find that the defendant violated clearly settled law;
and if it finds the facts another way, then it must find that the defendant
did not violate clearly settled law.
Id.; see also Stone v. Peacock, 968 F.2d 1163, 1166 (lth Cir. 1992) ("If there are
disputed issues of fact concerning qualified immunity that must be resolved by a
full trial and which the district court determines that the jury should resolve, spe-
cial interrogatories would be appropriate.").
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V. CONCLUSION
Qualified immunity, evidentiary burdens and federal civil procedures
are complicated in and of themselves. When all three are combined, it is
understandable how mistakes and confusion might arise. All the same,
the Supreme Court has unnecessarily and erroneously complicated § 1983
litigation by characterizing qualified immunity as a question of law and
suggesting, one might even say directing, lower courts to resolve qualified
immunity at the summary judgment stage. Qualified immunity does not
present a question of law, but rather an issue of law application. Further-
more, while courts may resolve some qualified immunity disputes without
making a factual determination, others are "fact-dependent" mixed-ques-
tions of law and fact. On occasion, the Supreme Court has recognized this
distinction. 227 Nevertheless, the Court's instructions regarding summary
judgment as a procedural tool with which to resolve qualified immunity
disputes is, in many cases, misguided.
While some legal scholars and judges may view pre-trial disposition
motions as largely identical and evidentiary burdens as a technicality hav-
ing little effect on the outcome, both of these views are mistaken.22 8 As
discussed previously, courts employ different standards of review when de-
ciding a motion to dismiss or a motion on the judgment as compared to a
motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, how the court categorizes
the disposition will affect the plaintiff's ability to "survive" the motion.
Furthermore, motions granted pursuant to Rule 12(c) and Rule 56 are
viewed as a decision on the merits and are final. In contrast, courts do not
"reach the merits" when ruling on motions to dismiss. As a result, the
plaintiff may be able to file a new complaint based upon the same allega-
tions when the claim is dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6).
One irony of the court's misdirection regarding summary judgment
as a tool to resolve qualified immunity disputes is that, on several occa-
sions, the Court has noted that a "'firm application of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure' is fully warranted." 2 29 Nevertheless, several Supreme
Court cases addressing pre-trial disposition of qualified immunity disputes
227. See generaly Johnson v.Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 305 (1995) (discussing availa-
bility of interlocutory appeal when qualified immunity dispute involves question of
law as opposed to question of fact).
228. See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 5C FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 1369 (4th ed. 2004). Wright and Miller explain:
[T] here is probably little need for retaining the judgment on the plead-
ing as a separate procedure for testing the sufficiency of the pleadings.
Its essential function, that of permitting the summary disposition of cases
that do not involve any substantive dispute that justifies a full trial can be
handled more effectively under the summary judgment procedure or, on
occasion, the Rule 12(b) (6) motion.
Id.
229. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597 (1998) (citing Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald, 457 U.S 800, 819-20 (1982)) (indicating that firm application of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure can be warranted).
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contradict the structure and purpose of the pre-trial disposition proce-
dures outlined in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
As discussed in Part IV of this Article, summary judgment is often a
poor tool with which to resolve law-based qualified immunity disputes.
Summary judgment is intended to determine if there is sufficient evidence
to warrant trial proceedings. Often, however, qualified immunity disputes
will not require a factual determination. In those cases, Rules 12(b)(6)
and Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are much better
suited to resolve qualified immunity claims than is summary judgment.
Furthermore, when qualified immunity does turn on a factual issue, it will
often be inappropriate for courts to render judgment at the summary
judgment stage; instead, courts will have to proceed to trial and allow a
jury to render a factual determination. 230
In order to fairly and accurately resolve qualified immunity disputes,
courts must take care in selecting and employing the procedural tools
available to them. As of the date of this Article, courts have done a poor
job following the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in § 1983 qualified im-
munity disputes. If courts are to resolve qualified immunity claims in ac-
cordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, they must first
understand the nature of the claim facing them and then select the proce-
dural tool best suited to resolve that claim. In short, they must look be-
yond summary judgment.
230. See Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 311 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Poe
v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 425-26 (6th Cir. 1988)) ("[S]ummary judgment would
not be appropriate if there is a factual dispute (i.e., a genuine issue of material
fact) involving an issue on which the question of immunity turns."); Sharrar v.
Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 828 (3d Cir. 1997) (asserting that issue only exists for jury
where historical facts material to issues are in dispute).
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